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Preface  
 
Early on in grad school I had a few experiences that were formative for this thesis.  
Their content didn’t appear to be about philosophy at the time, but they did 
collectively start to give me an impression of the characters that made up my lot – 
the lot in which I, of course, was a fairly stereotypical member.  On an early phone 
conversation with my mother, I made some remark about my cousin.  It was, as far 
as I recall, true, but unflattering.  My mother responded, “You shouldn’t think that 
about her – she’s your cousin!”  I remember being struck at the time with the 
seeming absurdity of that response.  Because (somewhat unfortunately for my 
mother) I am who I am, I asked her to clarify: “Wait, do you mean that I shouldn’t 
say it? You do agree it’s true, right?”  She demurred about whether it was true – a 
telling sign, I thought! – and doubled down: “No, I’m saying that you shouldn’t have 
even believed it in the first place!”  My mom, I concluded to myself, was evidently 
deeply confused.  Sure, there was no reason to go around saying unflattering things 
that didn’t need to be said, but surely the only thing that determined whether I 
should believe those things was whether or not they were true!   
Pub hangouts were populated by groups of grad students from different 
departments – economists, art historians, political scientists… I noticed early on 
that the philosophers had a rather distinctive habit that no one else seemed to 
share.  We were prone to correcting people – each other, friends from other 
departments, ourselves, sometimes all of the above in a single utterance.  The 
striking part was how little the corrections usually mattered.  More often than not 
they were simply distractions from the overall trajectory of some tale or other.  
Someone would set out to tell a story and a philosopher would interrupt to provide 
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some correction of a trivial detail.  Or sometimes it was a sustained interruption in 
order to debate the importance of a nearby distinction or the truth of some factual 
matter.  Whatever the variety, the corrections apparently seemed sufficiently 
fitting or necessary for us to judge them worth it.  I started talking about this habit 
with friends and we gave it a name – fact-a-donning! Fact-a-don strikes again!   
Maybe a good explanation of what unites these occurrences is just rudeness 
or some kind of curious social ineptitude.  That is almost certainly true.  But it’s at 
least a very particular breed of curious ineptitude and one that seems to plague 
philosophers at rates higher than the general population.  And besides, there were 
other pieces of the puzzle.  It didn’t take long to realize that a certain way of 
carrying oneself in seminars or a certain attitude towards one’s own work seemed 
straightforwardly linked to success.  The surer one seemed about the quality of 
their work, the likelier they were to talk about it and write about it and solicit 
feedback.  And, it’s not hard to see, the more one produced and the more feedback 
one got, the better things seemed to go.  So even though at the beginning, the 
confidence and the beliefs in the goodness of one’s work in many cases appeared 
unwarranted, the strategy (if it could even be called that) seemed like a winner.  
The trick was just how to cultivate those beliefs.   
These things together started to shake loose a kind of commitment that I 
think I had before held pretty deeply.  It was a commitment to the value of getting 
at the truth – wherever and whenever.  How important was believing the truth? 
Was it important to set one’s beliefs right about insignificant features about one’s 
family members?  Or to make sure that everyone had the correct background 
beliefs when listening to a friend’s story, no matter their relation to the narrative 
arc?  I take it the answers to these questions are likely obvious to a lot of people 
(probably people whose friends like them more).  But I think there’s something 
about philosophers that can make it seem to us as if the value of true belief reigns 
supreme – that if one is in a position in which one’s evidence licenses the adoption 
of a belief, don’t suspend or think about something else - go ahead! Get to the 
bottom of it! Believe it!  We will have thereby added a true belief to the stock and 
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whether or not we choose to act on that belief is a separate matter entirely!  That if 
believing that one’s work is good or one is talented in philosophy correlates with 
eventually becoming a better philosopher, well, ideally one would get themselves 
to do the thing that creates the better results and figure out how to do it without 
deceiving oneself!    
In the Republic, Socrates talks about the nature of philosophers.  They 
always love learning, he says, about that which is unchanging and real. “They must 
be without falsehood – they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a 
love of the truth.” Is it possible, he asks, “for the same nature to be a philosopher – 
a lover of wisdom – and a lover of falsehood?” Of course not, agrees Glaucon.  
Socrates goes on, “Then someone who loves learning must above all strive for 
every kind of truth from childhood on” (485a-d).   
If, by striving for truth and refusing to accept falsehood, what we uncover is 
that we were wrong – that it’s not true that every truth is worth having and that 
we must hate all falsehoods – then what?  Maybe Socrates is right that the true 
philosophers love truth indiscriminately.  I, however, difficult as it often feels, am 
striving for what I see as a better – a lesser – relationship with the truth, and even 
more popularity in pubs.  
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Abstract 
 
Epistemologists frequently claim that the question “What should I believe?” 
demarcates the field of epistemology.  This question is then compared to the 
question asked in ethics: “What should I do?”  The question and the ensuing 
comparison, it is thought, specify both the content and the normativity at stake in 
epistemology.  I argue that both of the assumptions embedded in this demarcation 
are problematic.  By thinking of epistemology’s focal question in this light, first, we 
risk importing our assumptions about the epistemic domain into our 
understanding of the nature and normativity of the belief state, and second, we 
come to have a false picture of the normativity that supposedly underlies the 
domain.   
 In Chapter 1, “The Doxastic Account of the Epistemic”, I explore a range of 
views that assume there to be an essential connection between belief and truth.  I 
look at views that treat all beliefs as attempts to believe the truth, views that 
consider belief’s biological function to be accurate representation, and views that 
hold that the very concept of belief is a normative concept.  I go on to explore 
instrumentalist conceptions of belief’s truth connection and conduct an inquiry 
into the value of true belief.  I conclude that neither the value of true belief nor an 
essential connection between belief and truth can explain epistemic normativity.  
 In Chapter 2, “Evidential Exclusivity, Correctness, and the Nature of Belief” I 
note that epistemologists have recently argued that the best explanation for the 
apparent truth of a pair of claims - “Transparency” and “Exclusivity” – is that belief 
is subject to a standard of correctness such that a belief that p is correct if and only 
if p is true.  I argue that the proposed explanation unduly privileges one part of 
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belief’s full functional profile – its role in deliberation – and that a more complete 
consideration of belief’s role in cognition suggests an alternative explanation for 
Exclusivity and Transparency but denies belief’s standard of correctness.   
In Chapter 3, “Tradeoffs and Epistemic Value”, I look at a debate about 
whether epistemic norms are teleological.  Though it’s standard to assume in 
keeping with teleology that certain goals or values explain the content of our 
norms, a collection of recent papers have aimed to show that this assumption can’t 
be correct because teleological norms countenance tradeoffs but epistemic norms 
don’t countenance tradeoffs.  I note that the kind of non-teleological view that 
countenances no tradeoffs whatsoever is actually quite extreme and virtually 
unheard of in ethics. I go on to make the case that norms that license no tradeoffs 
can’t reasonably be taken to be grounded in value at all, and thus can’t be 
understood to give rise to necessary normativity.  I conclude by suggesting that we 
broaden our conception of the epistemic domain to recognize teleological norms 
that provide recommendations for methods of inquiry or pursuit of significant 
truth or knowledge.   
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 - The Doxastic Account of the Epistemic 
 
1 Introduction to the Thesis 
Epistemologists often identify “What should I believe?” as the question that 
demarcates the field of epistemology.  The question, I think, embeds two 
assumptions.  The first assumption is that epistemology can supply the answer to 
the question of what we should believe.  The second assumption is that 
epistemology is normative.  Both of these assumptions warrant further scrutiny.  
Take the first assumption: though some epistemologists go on to clarify the 
question they’re asking – “What (epistemically) should I believe?”,  in many cases 
the question remains unqualified.  Regardless of whether qualifications are made 
explicit, epistemologists proceed by adopting a certain perspective in answering 
the question.  What characterizes the epistemic perspective?  Consider the 
following cases:  Bonjour asks us to  
 
[s]uppose that I have a dear friend who has stood by me and 
supported me through many trials and crises, often at considerable 
cost to himself. Now this friend stands accused of a horrible crime, 
everyone else believes him to be guilty, and there is substantial 
evidence for this conclusion. Suppose too that I have no independent 
evidence concerning the matter and also that my friend knows me 
well enough that an insincere claim to believe in his innocence will 
surely be detected. If in these difficult circumstances I can bring 
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myself to believe in his innocence, it is surely plausible to say that 
there is a sense in which I am justified in so believing; indeed such a 
belief might well be regarded as obligatory. But the justification in 
question is plainly not epistemic justification, but rather a kind of 
moral justification: even if my friend is in fact innocent, I obviously do 
not know on this basis that he is innocent, no matter how compelling 
a reason of this sort I may have for my belief. (1985, 6) 
 
A second example, reminiscent of one by William James: Suppose that I am 
a mountaineer.  The snow bridge I traveled on the way to the summit has melted 
and to safely return home I must leap a crevasse.  It’s fairly wide, and so my 
evidence that I will make it is not particularly strong.  In order to succeed, I need to 
feel confident.  If I hesitate, all will be lost.  Despite the fact that my evidence does 
not justify my belief that I will clear the gap, I should nevertheless believe that I 
will.   
In the first case, reasons of friendship, perhaps moral reasons, seem to 
license my belief in the innocence of my friend.  But these reasons, Bonjour claims, 
are not epistemic reasons.  He tells us two things about the epistemic perspective:  
first, “epistemic justification is that species of justification which is appropriate to 
beliefs or judgments, rather than to actions, or decisions” and second, “[t]he 
distinguishing characteristic of epistemic justification is…its essential or internal 
relation to the cognitive goal of truth” (1985, 6).  The epistemic reasons in the first 
case, then, are the reasons exclusively related to the truth of whether or not the 
friend committed the crime.  In the second case, my wellbeing depends on having 
enough confidence to succeed.  So for prudential reasons, we think I should believe 
that I can leap the crevasse.  My epistemic reasons, in contrast, concern only my 
evidence that I will, in fact, succeed in making a leap of that length. 
These cases are typical in their treatment of the epistemic perspective as 
marked by its connection to truth.  But notice Bonjour’s other claim: that what 
makes a species of justification epistemic justification is that it’s the kind of 
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justification which is appropriate to beliefs.  When we combine the thought that 
epistemic evaluation is that evaluation which is appropriate to beliefs, and the 
thought that the epistemic perspective is marked by exclusively truth-related 
concerns, it’s easy to see how we begin to develop a picture in which beliefs are 
essentially evaluated in relation to considerations having to do with their truth.   
The second assumption is that the epistemic domain is normative.  This 
claim is often made explicitly, as in Alston and Feldman and Talbot, but it’s also 
implicit in the language that epistemologists employ.1  Epistemologists speak of 
justification and warrant and virtue and what we ought or should believe.  Bonjour 
talks of what justification is appropriate to beliefs and refers to truth as the 
cognitive goal.  This evaluations treats truth as something of value, to be pursued 
or admired or promoted.  The normativity of the epistemic domain is often 
brought into further focus through a comparison with ethics.  Some 
epistemologists refer to epistemology as the “ethics of belief”.  Though Clifford’s 
1877 eponymous piece which christened the phrase did in fact hold that it was 
morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence, the contemporary “ethics of 
belief” literature captures a wide array of views that attempt to characterize 
epistemic normativity.   
It’s also common to analogize the epistemologist’s focal question “What 
should I believe?” to the ethicist’s guiding question “What should I do?”.  Consider 
the book blurb for Kelly and Pryor’s suggested textbook What Should We Believe?: 
The Fundamentals of Epistemology. In introducing the text, they write: 
 
Consider the following question: 'What should I believe?' This 
question is a normative question. It is, of course, notoriously obscure 
exactly what one is claiming when one claims that a given question is 
a normative question. (Indeed, this issue is among those which we will 
explore.) But intuitively, the question 'What should I believe?' differs 
                                                      
1 Alston 1988; Feldman 1988; Talbot 2014. 
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from purely descriptive questions such as 'What do I believe?' or 
'What will I believe?' in a way in which it resembles other paradigm 
normative questions such as 'What should I do?' It is this question 
which serves as both the starting point and guiding focus of our book, 
an exploration of select issues in contemporary epistemology…2   
 
In the same vein, Kim claims that “[e]pistemology is a normative discipline 
as much as, and in the same sense as, normative ethics” (1988, 383).  Morality is a 
paradigm normative domain.  We take moral reasons to bestow a kind of 
necessary force on us.  Though we need not think they give us overriding reasons – 
sometimes we think we have better reason to go on vacation with our families or 
friends than to volunteer at the local shelter, we typically think they always give us 
at least some reason to act in accordance with them.  The comparison between 
epistemology’s and ethics’ guiding questions suggests that we view epistemic 
normativity in the same light: epistemic norms bestow a kind of necessary force 
that always give us some reason to comply with them.   
This thesis is dedicated to examining both of these assumptions: first, that 
epistemology can tell us what to believe – in other words, that the epistemic 
perspective, with its commitment to evaluation exclusively in accordance with 
truth-related considerations, can determine the norms for the state of belief, and 
second, that epistemic norms are normative in much the same way as ethical 
norms.  In what follows, I will argue that the first assumption serves to collapse the 
distinction between epistemic norms and norms of belief.  It’s to give a doxastic 
account of the epistemic.  By conceiving of the norms of the epistemic and the 
norms of the doxastic as co-extensional, we run the risk of importing our 
assumptions about the epistemic domain into our understanding of what the belief 
state is like and what norms govern (or do not govern) it, thereby pre-supposing 
                                                      
2 Thomas Kelly and James Pryor: https://www.amazon.co.uk/What-Should-Believe-Fundamentals-
Epistemology/dp/140512363X. Though it appears the book never quite came to be, its description is 
sufficient for current purposes. 
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an answer to what beliefs we should adopt.  It’s no mere terminological dispute. 
Though some philosophers appear to unreflectively treat the epistemic domain 
and the doxastic domain as interchangeable, others do so to signal a deep-seated 
commitment to understanding the normativity of belief as essentially epistemic 
normativity.  Whereas the norms of the epistemic domain are stipulatively truth-
directed, an examination of the functional role belief plays in our overall cognition 
suggests that belief norms shouldn’t be thought to be similarly truth-directed, but 
are perhaps better understood as being oriented toward informing our practical 
cognition in ways that stably contribute to wellbeing.  In respect to the second 
assumption, I will argue that whether or not epistemic norms can be thought to be 
normative in a relevantly similar sense as ethical norms – in other words, whether 
they always give us at least some reason to follow them, depends on how we 
understand epistemic value.  I look at the existing options that attempt to explain 
epistemic normativity and argue that none of them result in a picture in which 
epistemic norms bestow necessary normative force the way moral norms do. 
Here’s a more detailed roadmap:   
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will look at how epistemologists 
characterize epistemic normativity.  In particular, I’ll take account of the fact that a 
main data point about epistemic evaluation is that it applies necessarily – in other 
words, it does not depend on one’s individual goals or desires.  I’ll then ask in 
virtue of what do epistemic norms derive their necessary force?  I take there to be 
two prominent ways of attempting to ground the necessary normative force of 
epistemic norms.  The first is via epistemic constitutivism about belief.  I will look at 
the three main varieties of epistemic constitutivism and will argue that none of 
them vindicate epistemic normativity’s necessary force.  The second way to ground 
necessary epistemic normativity is through the value of true belief.  I will argue 
that we don’t have good reason to view true belief as instrumentally or finally 
valuable in a way that guarantees necessary normative force.  Where does this 
leave us in regard to the question about how the normativity of belief relates to 
epistemic normativity? By eliminating the epistemic constitutivist route, we will 
 6 
see that there’s nothing essential about belief or about believers that dictates that 
doxastic norms are necessarily truth-directed.  Further, when we examine belief 
formation, we see that there are many evidentially isolated doxastic processes that 
systematically contribute to our wellbeing.  We should then conclude that the 
norms of belief are not co-extensive with epistemic norms.  This distinction will 
lead the way to an axial account of the epistemic, in which epistemic norms are 
defined, not as the norms of belief, but in terms of their orientation towards truth 
or knowledge or other cognitive goods.   
Chapters 2 and 3 should be seen as applications of the work of Chapter 1 to 
current problems in epistemology.  In Chapter 2, “Evidential Exclusivity, 
Correctness, and the Nature of Belief”, I set out to look at a pair of related claims – 
“Exclusivity” and “Transparency” - that have been used to draw conclusions about 
features of the belief state.  Both claims target the way in which only 
considerations having to do with the truth of a candidate belief are relevant during 
deliberation about what to believe.  I look at the suggestion that the best 
explanation for the existence of these constraints on deliberation is that beliefs are 
subject to a standard of correctness such that a belief that p is correct if and only if 
p is true.  There are a number of interpretations of how we ought to see the 
normativity at play in belief’s standard of correctness.  I argue that none of them 
succeed and that the standard of correctness explanation for Exclusivity and 
Transparency unduly privileges belief’s role in deliberation, but fails to account for 
other parts of belief’s functional profile.  Ultimately I reject the standard of 
correctness proposal and suggest the beginning of an alternate explanation.   
Chapter 3, “Tradeoffs and Epistemic Value”, takes a look at an ongoing 
debate about whether epistemic normativity is teleological.  Though it’s standard 
to assume that certain goals or values, such as believing the truth and avoiding 
falsehoods, explain the content of epistemic norms, a few recent papers have 
drawn attention to the fact that teleological theories of normativity countenance 
tradeoffs.  Since epistemic norms, or at least the norm that tells us to believe the 
truth during deliberation, appear not to countenance tradeoffs, these views claim 
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that epistemic normativity can’t be teleological.  I look in more detail at what it 
would be for a theory to license no tradeoffs and point out that it would be a quite 
extreme sort of view – extreme enough that it appears to receive little to no 
representation in the ethics literature.  I argue that norms that never license 
tradeoffs, even when great value in the domain is at stake, can’t reasonably be 
taken to be grounded in value at all.  I go on to claim that this should lead us to 
understand the normativity that underlies the epistemic domain as in fact very 
different from moral normativity. Whereas moral norms confer necessary 
normative force, epistemic norms of the kind that don’t license tradeoffs do not.  
This conclusion paves the way for the suggestion that we expand our conception of 
epistemic normativity to include norms aimed at inquiry or the pursuit of 
significant truths.   
2 What are Epistemic Norms? 
So to start: what are epistemic norms? Philosophers commonly talk about 
epistemic normativity as the normativity that governs belief.  And it’s commonly 
held that epistemic norms are the norms that describe correct belief acquisition 
and retention.  But in beginning an investigation into the source and content of 
epistemic normativity, it’s impossible to ignore the fact that uses of “epistemic” are 
mostly confined to academic language.  And the addition of talk about the 
epistemic to the academic lexicon appears to be relatively recent.  If we consider 
the epistemic to be a domain of value, we find that “epistemic” is unlike “moral”, 
“prudential”, “aesthetic”, or other domains of value whose lexical entries are more 
familiar outside of usage in academic works.  We must recognize, then, that 
“epistemic” (and its related concepts like “epistemic justification” or “epistemic 
warrant”) is a term of art.  We look to epistemologists to learn how the concept is 
deployed, but also must acknowledge that the fact that there exists little for us to 
grasp onto outside of its academic usage puts more pressure on us to be clear 
about what work we want it to do in epistemology.   
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I want to make two central observations about “epistemic” and its use in 
related concepts.  First, as I noted earlier with the example of leaping the crevasse, 
we apparently have (at least) two competing kinds of reasons.  On the one hand, 
given the fact that I have a strong desire to make the jump and the additional fact 
that a belief that I’ll succeed raises my likelihood of success, I have a reason to 
believe I’ll make it.  Statistical evidence in the form of, say, past failures of jumps 
over lesser distances, seems to give me a reason to believe I won’t make it.  We can 
distinguish between two broad kinds of reasons.  The first kind we might call a 
“state-given reason”. It tracks the benefit of being in a state such that I believe that 
I will make the jump.  The second kind is an “object-given reason”.  We can call the 
proposition “I will make the jump” the object of the belief that I will make the 
jump.  Typically we take object-given reasons that p to simply be evidence that p.  
Where state-given reasons are usually thought to map onto practical reasons, 
object-given reasons are thought to map onto epistemic reasons.3 
State-given reasons have come to be known in the literature as “wrong 
kinds of reasons” for some kinds of attitudes and object-given reasons have come 
to be known as “right kinds of reasons”.  What makes state-given reasons reasons 
of the right kind for belief and object-given reasons reasons of the wrong kind?  
One thing to note is a motivational asymmetry.  Whereas it usually feels easy to 
believe on the basis of object-given reasons, it feels much less easy to believe on the 
basis of state-given reasons.  At best, it often feels like we can only make use of 
indirect strategies to adopt beliefs in accordance with our state-given reasons.  
Schroeder notes two more reasons for the right/wrong reasons distinction.  He 
claims that, even if we become aware of “pragmatic” reasons, they do not seem to 
make belief on their basis “more rational qua belief” (2012, 459).  He goes on: “So 
there seems to be a distinctive dimension of rational assessment of beliefs – 
sometimes called epistemic rationality – that is affected by the epistemic reasons of 
which the subject is aware but not affected by the pragmatic reasons of which the 
                                                      
3 See Parfit 2001 for the distinction, and Schroeder 2012 for discussion of the distinction and how it 
maps onto the right/wrong kinds of reason divide.     
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subject is aware” (Ibid.).  In addition, a third important difference that makes 
epistemic reasons right reasons and pragmatic reasons wrong reasons is that 
“epistemic, but not pragmatic, reasons appear to bear on the correctness of belief.  
A belief is correct just in case it is true, and epistemic reasons for belief bear on 
whether that belief is true, but pragmatic reasons are irrelevant to its truth” (Ibid., 
460). 
In “Evidential Exclusivity, Correctness, and the Nature of Belief,” I try to 
argue that the motivational asymmetry shouldn’t lead us to treat state-given 
reasons as wrong kinds of reasons, incorrect reasons, or in any sense lesser 
reasons for belief.  For now I want to note that Schroeder’s second and third 
reasons for the distinction amount to little other than restatements of the 
assumption that epistemic reasons are reasons that have to do with the truth of a 
belief and that only truth-based reasons can be considered reasons of the right 
kind.  When Schroeder says that state-given reasons don’t make belief “more 
rational qua belief” (and that object-given reasons do make belief more rational 
qua belief), we can see a direct sense in which truth-directed reasons are privileged 
in determining what we ought to believe.4  Why does truth-directedness get 
privileged in the evaluation of goodness qua belief?   
We began by noting that epistemic norms are commonly taken to be norms 
that govern correct belief acquisition.  This is part of a long and by now familiar 
practice in philosophy that assumes an essential connection between belief and 
truth.  In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle says regarding the intellect that the 
“good and bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of 
everything intellectual)” (1139a 27-29). We find expression of this essential 
connection in contemporary epistemologists’ claims that truth is the “aim of 
belief”, the cognitive or biological function of belief, or the constitutive or 
                                                      
4 Though sometimes epistemologists use “rational” to target the idea of “structural rationality”, where 
being rational consists in ensuring that our attitudes satisfy certain structural or coherence 
requirements, (see for example John Broome’s 2013 “Rationality through Reasoning”), there’s no prima 
facie reason for us not to interpret “rational” here in keeping with the more familiar notion of “response 
rationality”, where being rational consists in correctly respond to whatever reasons that one has. 
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conceptual standard of correctness for belief.  Later, I will explore each of these 
options for understanding belief’s essential truth connection.  But for now, take for 
examples the following claims:  
 
Williams, on truth as the aim of belief: “It is not a contingent fact that 
I cannot bring it about, just like that, that I believe something…Why is 
this? One reason is connected with the characteristic of beliefs that 
they aim at the truth.” (1973, 148)  
 
Gibbard, on belief’s standard of correctness: “For belief, correctness 
is truth. Correct belief is true belief. My belief that snow is white is 
correct just in case the belief is true, just in case snow is white.” (2005, 
338)  
 
Grimm, on the primacy of distinctively epistemic evaluation: “It seems 
clear enough…that even though we can evaluate beliefs relative to 
countless different ‘fundamental values’…the end of realizing the 
truth enjoys a special sort of status when it comes to the evaluation of 
belief. (2009, 256)  
 
Velleman, on how norms flow from the very nature or concept of 
belief:   “I take it to be a conceptual truth that beliefs are correct when 
true and incorrect when false: false beliefs are necessarily faulty or 
mistaken. What’s more, I don’t think that the fault in false beliefs can 
consist in their tendency to misdirect our behavior, and even some 
false beliefs can direct us well enough.  False beliefs are faulty in 
themselves, antecedently to and independently of any untoward 
practical consequences.” (2000, 277-8)  
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The thing that these various interpretations of the belief-truth connection 
have in common is that they take the evaluation of a belief to necessarily or 
essentially depend on how the belief satisfies their preferred articulation of the 
truth connection.  Thus, what it is to be an epistemic evaluation of a belief as 
opposed to, say, an evaluation of its moral or prudential value, is to be an 
evaluation of a belief qua belief.  We can begin to make sense of such essentialist 
evaluation by thinking about some artifact.  In considering, say, a hole puncher, it’s 
appropriate to make certain evaluations, such as the sharpness of the hole puncher 
and how well it punches holes, but not others, such as how well it works as a 
doorstop.  The appropriate evaluations seem to be ones that are set by its function 
or purpose, which flow from the essential nature of the hole puncher.  This is the 
doxastic assumption about the epistemic – that consideration of the normativity of 
beliefs in general is essentially epistemic normativity – and all of these authors that 
make this assumption hold a doxastic account of the epistemic. 
The first observation shows the centrality of the truth connection to the 
epistemic perspective.  The second observation I want to make is about the 
apparent universal applicability of the epistemic perspective.  Whereas the views 
above seem to attribute our reason to believe in accord with the evidence to the 
nature of belief itself, there’s another seemingly natural answer to the question 
about the source of normativity of epistemic reasons.  This sort of view explains 
why facts about evidence ground facts about what we have reason to believe in 
terms of the relationship between believing in accord with the evidence and 
achieving the ends or goals that we have.  This kind of instrumentalist view sees 
the epistemic requirement to believe in accord with the evidence as a specific 
instance of the more general requirement to take the means to our ends.  Though 
in some sense this can seem like a more natural and satisfying explanation of the 
source of epistemic normativity, we have to take note of an immediate problem the 
instrumentalist about epistemic reasons seems to face.5 
                                                      
5 This is not to claim that there can’t be an acceptable instrumentalist account of universal reasons.  One 
might claim, as Kornblith attempts in his 1993 “Epistemic Normativity” that everyone has instrumental 
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Make a distinction between a universal reason and a particular reason.  
Universal reasons are reasons for all agents, regardless of their own goals and 
desires.  The fact that someone is hurt seems to be a universal reason, because it’s 
a reason for any person to help.  Particular reasons, on the other hand, apply only 
to agents whose interests would be served by compliance.  The fact that Christine 
is in Boston is a particular reason for me to purchase plane tickets to Boston, since 
it depends on my desire to visit her and doesn’t provide such a reason for other 
agents who don’t share my desire.  If there’s anything that seems to be held fixed in 
accounts of epistemic normativity, though, it’s that epistemic reasons don’t depend 
on anyone’s particular interests.  Kelly puts this point nicely:  
 
…[F]rom the fact that some subjects are matters of complete 
indifference to me, it does not follow that I will inevitably lack 
epistemic reasons for holding beliefs about those subjects. If, despite 
my utter lack of interest in the question of whether Bertrand Russell 
was left-handed, I stumble upon strong evidence that he was, then I 
have strong epistemic reasons to believe that Bertrand Russell was 
left-handed. Indeed, my epistemic reasons will be no different than 
they would be if I had acquired the same evidence deliberately, 
because I did have the goal of finding out whether Russell was left 
handed. Once I come into possession of evidence which strongly 
supports that claim that p, then I have epistemic reasons to believe 
that p, regardless of whether I presently have or previously had the 
goal of believing the truth about p, or any wider goal which would be 
better achieved in virtue of my believing the truth about p. (2003, 
625)  
                                                      
reason to favor a cognitive system which generates true belief. See also Sharadin’s 2016 “Epistemic 
Instrumentalism and the Reason to Believe in Accord with the Evidence.” The challenge, of course, is in 
making such an account plausible, given the radically varied ends and goals of individual agents.  I will 
raise a criticism about such views later in response to constitutivist accounts that depend on the nature 
of believers.   
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Feldman confirms this data point.  He takes the following norm to 
characterize epistemic normativity’s fundamental commitment: “[I]f a person is 
going to adopt any attitude toward a proposition, then that person ought to believe 
it if his current evidence supports it, disbelieve it if his current evidence is against 
it, and suspend judgment about it if his evidence is neutral (or close to neutral)” 
(2000, 679).  He claims that this norm applies regardless of a person’s particular 
goal to believe the truth or acquire knowledge. He goes on to say that “all people 
epistemically ought to follow their evidence, not just those who have adopted 
some specifically epistemic goals” (Ibid., 682).  In the same vein, Sosa writes that 
the “aptness” of a belief is not proportional to how well the belief furthers our 
goals of believing truths and not believing falsehoods (2003, 159).  Such assertions 
of the universality of epistemic reasons are very common.6    
3 The Epistemic Constitutivist Response 
What could explain the fact that epistemic norms seem to apply to agents 
necessarily, regardless of their particular interests or goals?  A feature essential or 
constitutive of belief or believing is a good candidate for such necessity.  The idea 
that beliefs “aim at the truth” has been assumed to be just such a feature.  Williams 
wrote in 1973 that “belief aims at truth” and a large literature has spawned in 
which philosophers have tried to capture the exact sense in which this slogan 
seems right.7  In this section I’m going to explain the epistemic constitutivist’s 
general strategy and then look at the three main breeds of constitutivist response 
that appear in the literature.   
Constitutivist arguments in general claim that there are certain features of 
some, for example, attitude or action, that necessarily make it the case that, insofar 
as we act in that way or have that attitude at all, we are committed to some further 
                                                      
6 For other instances, see Zagzebski 2003, David 2001, and Grimm 2008. 
7 Williams “Deciding to Believe” in Problems of the Self. 
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action, aim, following of principles, etc.  In the epistemic constitutivist’s case, to 
claim that “aiming at truth” is constitutive of belief is to claim that part of what it is 
for some mental attitude to be a belief is that it is directed at or regulated by truth.  
Some candidate mental attitude, then, will not count as a belief if it isn’t aimed at 
truth in whatever relevant sense the particular constitutivist view requires.  If the 
epistemic constitutivist goes on to claim that believing is a non-optional activity, 
then it will follow that the aim that believing requires is also non-optional.  If in 
addition, conformance to the non-optional aim requires conformance to some 
norm, then it will follow that that norm necessarily applies to us.   
This is indeed the strategy of epistemic constitutivists.8  They claim that 
belief constitutively aims at the truth: that part of what it is for a mental state to 
count as a belief is that it is directed towards being true.  And, as we saw in the last 
section, since epistemic norms are norms that describe the truth-directed 
conditions under which we are permitted, required, forbidden, etc. from believing 
propositions, it follows that by engaging in belief formation at all, we plausibly are 
required to conform to epistemic norms.  In replying to Gary, an anti-epistemology 
student who inquires about the possibility of “opting out of the belief business”, 
Railton describes the inescapability of belief:  All agents act and form plans. These 
actions and plans constitutively involve beliefs and are deliberately formed in part 
on the basis of beliefs.  If we were to try to replace belief with some other mental 
attitude, say, wishing, we wouldn’t form any intentions at all.  And since our 
conception of ourselves as agents existing through time involves memories and 
expectations which themselves involve beliefs, deleting beliefs from our mental 
stock would leave us with no notion of personal identity:   
 
Being ‘in the belief business’ therefore isn’t as optional as you 
imagine.  It is a precondition of agency.  So the argument is non-
hypothetical in a familiar sense: as an agent you must possess beliefs; 
                                                      
8 See Côté-Bouchard 2016 for a description of the constitutivst strategy and directions to Wiland and 
Steglich-Petersen for quote selection.   
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as a belie[f] you must represent certain of your propositional 
attitudes as accountable to truth and as disciplined by truth-oriented 
norms…; therefore, as an agent you must so represent at least some 
of your attitudes, irrespective of what other goals this might or might 
not serve.  A self-representation of certain of one’s attitudes as 
“aiming at” truth is partially constitutive of belief, which in turn is 
partially constitutive of agency.  Let us, then, call this sort of argument 
a constitutive argument. (1997, 98-99)     
 
So we can’t help but be believers.  And once we are, we necessarily have mental 
states that aim toward truth. Wiland writes:  
 
We can extract a norm about how we should believe based upon what 
it is to believe.  More specifically, the nature of belief tells us 
something about reasons for belief…The justification for believing the 
truth doesn’t come from something external to the nature of belief 
itself…Rather, if you are even in the business of believing things, you 
thereby have reason to believe what’s true. Truth is the constitutive 
aim of belief, and so reasons to believe are necessarily related to 
considerations concerning the truth of what’s believed. (2012, 117-
118)    
 
And finally, we move from the claim that some attitude (belief) is inescapable for 
us, and the claim that some aim (truth) is necessary for that attitude, to the claim 
that the non-optional activity’s non-optional aim requires conformance to a certain 
norm:  Steglich-Petersen tells us that aim theorists explain the norms of “epistemic 
justification governing belief” – beliefs should be formed in ways that make it likely 
that they are true – and that a “natural explanation of such epistemic norms is that 
following them promotes the aims of believing truly…The aim theory promises, in 
other words, a simple, unified, and prima facie unproblematic explanation of 
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epistemic normativity” (2009, 396).  And thus the epistemic constitutivist has laid 
the path for an explanation of epistemic normativity that secures the universal 
applicability that we were looking for.  What we’ll look at next are the available 
suggestions for how to interpret the sense in which belief “aims at the truth”.  
We can call the first epistemic constitutivist construal of the way in which 
beliefs aim at the truth the Attempt Model.  On the Attempt Model, because of the 
nature of the state of belief, every time someone believes a particular proposition, 
they attempt to believe the truth about that proposition.  The necessity of 
epistemic norms is explained by the universality of the claim – every instance of 
belief formation is an attempt to believe the truth, and the normativity of epistemic 
norms is explained by the fact that attempts are successes when they accomplish 
their aim and failures when they fail to accomplish their aim.  Sosa has an 
apparently straightforward interpretation of the way in which beliefs are attempts.  
He compares beliefs to shots made by an archer.  “The good shot is the central 
value that organizes the sport of archery and the criticism proper to it…Truth is 
similarly a fundamental value of epistemology. Evaluation is distinctively 
epistemic when it is concerned with truth” (2007, 77-78).   
In a later work he goes on:  
 
The archer’s shot is a good example.  The shot aims to hit the target, 
and its success can be judged by whether it does so or not, by its 
accuracy…A performance is better than otherwise for not having 
failed, i.e., for not having fallen short of its objective.  In line with that, 
it is good if it succeeds, if it reaches its objective…Take any 
performance with a first-order aim, such as the archery shot and the 
tennis serve. That performance then has the induced aim of attaining 
its first-order aim… The case of knowledge is just the special case 
where the performance is cognitive or doxastic.  Belief aims at the 
truth, and is accurate or correct if true. Belief has accordingly the 
induced aim of attaining that objective. (2009, 9) 
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So the shot hits the target and is successful just in case the belief is true and is a 
failure just in case it misses the target by being false.  Epistemic virtues like true 
belief and knowledge are achievements on Sosa’s view.  Sosa thinks that shots are 
evaluated not just on their accuracy, but on the skill that is manifested in bringing 
about that accuracy.  He compares the adroitness necessary for a shot that hits the 
target because of an archer’s skill to knowledge, which he takes to be a more 
skillful and thus more valuable performance than true belief.  But knowledge can 
manifest success only if the belief reaches its objective and is thus successful.  He 
goes on to refer to his account of epistemic normativity as a sort of “performance 
normativity” (2009, 9-10).  
Two more examples of the Attempt Model of belief’s truth aim:9  
Humberstone writes that unless we take there to be a “criterion of success” in the 
case of an attitude towards a proposition and “unless that criterion is truth”, then 
the attitude is not a belief.  He continues: “So unless the attitude-holder has what 
we might call a controlling background intention that his or her attitudinizing is 
successful only if its propositional content is true, then the attitude taken is not 
that of belief” (1992, 73).  And Steglich-Petersen construes the necessary attempts 
of believers as intentions.  He tells us to “Suppose…you judge that John believes 
that the London train leaves at 5 p.m.. [Y]ou have [necessarily] judged that John 
has a certain aim or intention in so doing, namely, the aim of regarding that 
proposition as true only if it is in fact true” (2006, 499).  
So on Humberstone’s and Steglich-Petersen’s view, what makes a certain 
mental attitude a belief is essentially that we want to believe that proposition only 
if it’s true.  This makes epistemic norms out to be a variety of instrumental norms – 
they help us achieve our goal of believing the truth, yet are built into the very 
nature of belief.  This explanatory route, though, is problematic for the goals of the 
epistemic constitutivist who seeks to account for the necessary normative 
                                                      
9 References sourced from Hazlett’s “Humean Approaches to the Epistemic Value of True Belief” in his 
2013 A Luxury of the Understanding. 
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authority of epistemic norms.  It’s problematic, I think, for both targets of 
explanation.  It’s problematic for explaining the normative authority because we 
generally don’t take satisfaction of an agents’ means-ends goals as resulting in 
necessary normative force.  The epistemic constitutivist thinks that our aim of 
believing the truth supplies us with good reasons to believe the truth.  But we don’t 
take aims of, say, torturing, to supply us with necessary pro tanto reasons to 
torture.  This is a general problem for reasons internalism, and I take the more 
basic issue with the Attempt Model to be with the second target of explanation, 
namely the necessity, or the universality, of epistemic norms.   
Proponents of the Attempt Model often construe the belief aim in terms of 
intention.  Attempts, after all, are usually thought to be intentional.  Sosa construes 
beliefs as attempts and successful attempts as achievements.  Pritchard writes that 
“It seems an essential part of achievements that they involve certain motivational 
states on the part of the subject with regard to the success in question – in 
particular, that the subject is actively seeking to bring this success about” (2010, 
29). But it’s implausible that necessarily whenever we form a belief about p we 
intend to believe the truth about p.  This is doubtful for a number of reasons.  First, 
we often form beliefs unconsciously.  Any kind of belief formed unconsciously 
seems like a belief formed without intention.  But further, we form beliefs 
unconsciously through wishful thinking and other processes based largely on self-
deception.  It seems even less reasonable to characterize this sort of belief 
formation as exhibiting an intention to believe the truth.  Second, we often form 
true beliefs despite our desire to believe otherwise or despite utter indifference 
about their truth.  Kelly gives the example of a “friend” who blurts out the ending 
to a movie.  Kelly has no desire to learn the truth about the ending and would far 
rather not have heard the spoiler at all or believe something false about the ending 
(2003, 626).  And Grimm gives an example of absent-mindedly counting the 
clumps of dust in the waiting room at the dentist.  Despite having no curiosity 
about the correct number of clumps, you come to believe that there are 53 (Grimm 
2008, 731 describing a case from Sosa 2003).  Additionally, such an explanation 
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looks even less plausible when we consider that we often take the standards of 
belief attribution to be less demanding than complex attributions on which one 
believes that p only if one wants to believe that p only if p.  It seems reasonable to 
think that animals and toddlers believe things, but less reasonable to think that 
they want to form beliefs only if those beliefs are true.   
The Attempt Model needs for it to be the case that every belief involves an 
intention or desire to believe that p only if p.  To overcome this challenge, 
proponents might try to construe the relevant desire or intention as a general or 
global desire to believe the truth.  As Kvanvig puts it: “What we have is a general 
desire for the truth, and that interest attaches to particular truths in the manner of 
instantiation in predicate logic.  The default position for any truth is that our 
general interest in the truth applies to it” (2003, 41).  The claim that we have a 
general desire to believe the truth is worrisome, however.  If we take a general 
desire to believe the truth as a single desire to always believe the truth that applies 
to each possible instantiation, this isn’t right.  I know how valuable many kinds of 
non-truth-oriented belief formation processes are to my wellbeing, and so I for one 
don’t have the desire to always believe the truth.  Hazlett (2013) points out that we 
might construe a general desire in a second way: a general desire to believe the 
truth is to generally desire to believe the truth.  He compares it to a general desire 
to eat oysters.  The problem, he points out, with this construal is that there are 
times in which we don’t want to eat oysters, say, when we’re really full.  It doesn’t 
make sense to construe our desire to eat oysters as a pro tanto desire because it’s 
not as if the desire is always there but simply overridden in some circumstances.  
When we’re really full the desire isn’t there at all.  So it would be more accurate to 
construe such a desire as a prima facie desire.  But epistemic reasons aren’t prima 
facie reasons – if I have conclusive evidence that p, I don’t have a prima facie 
epistemic reason that could be absent in particular cases in which I have no desire 
to believe the truth.  Prima facie reasons don’t satisfy the universality requirement 
on epistemic norms.   
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The Attempt Model does not look like a promising explanation of epistemic 
normativity.  One might think, though, that a way in which it fails is instructive in 
pointing towards a different sort of strategy.  A primary complaint about the 
Attempt Model is that it simply isn’t true that believers always have intentions or 
desires to believe the truth.  A Biological Function model, in contrast, does not 
require that believers themselves have intentions or desires that their beliefs be 
true.  Instead, the Biological Function model posits the truth aim in belief itself.  
The biological function of the liver is to filter blood and it does so without any aim 
or desire or intention on the part of the person in whom the liver is housed.  Just as 
the liver does not function properly if it fails to filter blood, beliefs only function 
properly if they are true.  Velleman introduces an account of belief by saying that 
“…to believe a proposition is to accept it with the aim of thereby accepting a truth” 
(2000, 251).  Velleman recognizes, though, first, that something can be a belief 
regardless of the agent’s aims or intentions, and second, that there are creatures 
that have beliefs that don’t possess the concept of belief.  Thus his account of belief 
does not require the believer herself to have aims, but rather suggests that the aim 
belongs to the cognitive system itself.  The cognitive system, he says, regulates 
cognition by “forming, revising, and extinguishing beliefs in response to evidence 
and argument” (Ibid., 253).  It’s not just that the cognitive system in fact does this, 
but importantly that it’s part of its design to do this: “If a cognitive system isn’t 
regulated by mechanisms designed to track the truth, then it isn’t a belief: it’s some 
other kind of cognition. That’s why aiming at the truth is constitutive of belief” 
(Ibid., 17).   
The Biological Model’s predecessor, of course, is the idea that God designed 
our cognition to work in a certain way.10  On this view, truth is the aim of belief 
because God designed our beliefs to be true.  Epistemic normativity thus gains its 
authority from the goodness of a state’s functioning as it was intended to function.  
The Biological Model is more appealing to naturalistically minded philosophers 
                                                      
10 See for examples Descartes’ Fourth Meditation in Meditations on First Philosophy, and Plantinga’s 
proper function argument in Warrant and Proper Function (1993).  
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who worry about the fact that a view that beliefs were designed with an aim 
requires a designer to have designed that aim.  I think, however, that the Biological 
Model suffers from similar problems to a design view in accounting for its 
normative authority. 
Assumptions that the proper biological function of our mechanisms of belief 
production is production of true beliefs are very common.  Alston writes that “[t]he 
function of sense perception is to provide us with true beliefs about the immediate 
physical environment, in the same sense in which the function of the heart is to 
pump blood around the body” (2005, 33). Quine claims that “creatures 
inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency 
to die before reproducing their kind” (1994, 39).  And Dennett writes that “the 
capacity to believe would have no survival value unless it were a capacity to 
believe truths” (1971, 101).  Goldman’s work depends on the idea that cognition is 
oriented toward reliability, where reliability is spelled out in terms of production 
of true beliefs (1986).  And Millikan (1993) and Sullivan-Bissett (2017) both make 
the explicit claim that truth is the biological proper function of belief.11  
What is it to ascribe a biological function to our belief-producing 
mechanisms? Both Millikan and Sullivan-Bissett adopt historical accounts.  
According to Sullivan-Bissett, it’s that “very roughly, the function of some trait is to 
do whatever ancestors of that trait did which got them selected. For it to be 
appropriate to ascribe a biological function to our mechanisms of belief-
production, then, they need to have been selected for” (2017, S95).  She goes on to 
note that the claim that true beliefs are adaptive has been “taken to be obvious by 
many philosophers”, for the reasons that “beliefs which are true are more likely to 
dispose a creature to act in ways which will satisfy its desires, be they for food, 
warmth, sex, and so on” (2017, S95).  The strategy, then, is to claim that the fact 
that human ancestors had cognitive faculties that produced true beliefs conferred 
evolutionary advantage on them and that this fact explains why our beliefs aim at 
                                                      
11 For further representation of views that assume the adaptive value of true belief, see Cowie 2014 and 
Street 2009.  
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truth.  In order for this explanation to also be an explanation of the normative 
authority of our epistemic norms, we must assume that having properly 
functioning beliefs that were in this way selected for is itself good.  In what follows, 
I’m going to describe two problems for the Biological Function account.  First, it 
doesn’t seem possible to derive necessary normativity from proper function, and 
second, we have reason to be worried even if we were to interpret the Biological 
Function account as grounding epistemic normativity in the idea that the proper 
function of belief is instrumentally good for us. 
To begin, a note about the Biological Function model as a representative of 
epistemic constitutivism.  In order for the Biological Function model to accurately 
give a constitutivist account of the grounding of epistemic normativity, it must be 
the case that beliefs have a proper function and that this proper function is what 
provides us with normative epistemic reasons.  So the epistemic normativity must 
stem from the normativity of beliefs functioning as they ought to function.  Think 
back to the beginning comparison with a properly functioning liver.  We likely 
think that we have good reason to have organs that function properly.  But our 
reason for thinking this does not seem to be grounded in the very fact that proper 
functioning is good.  Rather it seems that we want our livers to function properly 
for instrumental reasons – because properly functioning livers help keep us alive 
and healthy.  But as epistemic constitutivists, we must hold that the normativity is 
grounded in proper functioning alone, not a further benefit of proper functioning.  
I will argue that this route can’t explain epistemic normativity.  In the next section, 
I will also explore the (more intuitive and probably more widely represented) 
thought that belief’s biological function is good for us, though we should 
understand that such a view is not a constitutivist view.   
Embedded in the very concept of “proper” function is that functioning in the 
way that was intended is good.  But we need a real explanation of the ensuing 
normativity, not just a notion that’s definitionally or trivially true.  Does a 
proponent of the organ analogy have an alternate explanation of the normativity of 
a liver’s functioning as it ought to function aside from the health advantages it 
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confers?  One might hold that the concept of a function does in fact entail facts 
about value or normative reasons.  If the function of a liver is to screen blood 
impurities, then livers that do that are good qua livers.  Analogously, if the function 
of belief is to represent accurately, then beliefs that are true are good qua belief 
and beliefs that are false are bad qua belief.  The problem with this way of thinking 
is that if oughts that derive from proper function could entail necessary normative 
authority, then there would be a proliferation of unintuitive reasons to fulfill the 
purposes of various entities or activities.  Torture seems to have a constitutive 
function – say inflicting severe pain in order to achieve some desired end – and so 
taking up the role of torturer would suffice to generate reasons for one to cause a 
lot of pain to one’s victim.  But we don’t think that the mere fact that there exists 
some activity that is governed by an aim gives us good reasons to fulfill the 
purposes of that aim.  Biological function is no different.  There exist plenty of 
examples of biological functions that don’t seem in themselves valuable.   
In addition, we should worry about the epistemic constitutivist’s goal to 
explain epistemic normativity through belief’s characteristic or essential nature, 
namely its connection to truth.  Hazlett gives the following example (2013, 192).  
Consider the biological function of sexual intercourse.  Plausibly the biological 
function of sex is reproduction.  Having sex was advantageous to our ancestors.  
We can evaluate tokens of sexual intercourse in light of the standards implied by 
the biological function, namely whether a particular token results in reproduction.  
On this standard sex is good when it results in reproduction and bad otherwise.  
He calls this “reproductive evaluation of sex” (Ibid.).  But we might think that 
though sometimes evaluation of sex via the reproductive standard is appropriate, 
often there are other standards that we deem more appropriate, such as whether 
or not the sex is pleasurable, whether or not it constitutes cheating on one’s 
partner, whether or not it was consensual, etc..  Though I think it’s plausible to 
think that epistemic evaluation of belief is but one metric along which beliefs can 
be evaluated, the Biological Model constitutivist sets out to explain epistemic 
norms through the fact that belief’s function is to be true.   
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One might object to the comparison of the function of torture and the 
function of belief.  Torture is an activity whose function is generally bad, while one 
might hold that true beliefs are always either instrumentally or finally good.  I 
think this idea is what theorists often have in mind when they refer to the adaptive 
benefit of belief formation processes that import true beliefs.  Such a move, though, 
grounds an explanation of epistemic normativity in the value of true belief rather 
than the constitutive aim of belief.  In the next section I will return to this idea.  For 
now, I will turn to the last breed of constitutivist explanation.   
The final model of epistemic constitutivism, the Normativist Model claims 
not that believers have any particular aims in believing, or that belief’s biological 
function is to represent truly, but rather that belief is a state that has a standard of 
correctness - a constitutive norm that governs it.  Because of belief’s constitutive 
standard, epistemic norms apply to agents regardless of whether they have any 
desire or intention to conduct themselves in accordance with that standard.  
Wedgwood writes: 
 
It is often claimed that beliefs aim at the truth.  Indeed this claim has 
often been thought to express an essential or constitutive feature of 
belief.  But this claim is obviously not literally true.  Beliefs are not 
little archers armed with little bows and arrows: they do not literally 
“aim” at anything. The claim must be interpreted as a metaphor. I 
propose to interpret this claim as a normative claim – roughly, as the 
claim that a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is 
true. (2002, 267)   
 
And Boghossian:  
 
I would maintain that the holding of this norm [For any p: One ought 
to believe that p only if p] is one of the defining features of the notion 
of belief: it's what captures the idea that it is constitutive of belief to 
 25 
aim at the truth. The truth is what you ought to believe, whether or 
not you know how to go about it, and whether or not you know if you 
have attained it. That, in my view, is what makes it the state that it is. 
(2003, 39)12 
 
The normativist interpretation of belief’s truth aim is often articulated in terms of 
a standard of correctness for belief, namely that for any subject and proposition, a 
belief is correct if and only if it’s true.  In describing the sense of correctness in 
play, Wedwood writes:  
 
To say that a mental state is ‘correct’ is to say that in having that 
mental state, one has got things ‘right’; one’s mental state is 
‘appropriate’.  To say that a mental state is ‘incorrect’ is to say that in 
having that mental state, one has got things ‘wrong’ or made a 
‘mistake’; one’s mental state is in a sense ‘defective’. (2002, 267) 
 
Normativist constitutivists think that the standard of correctness norm reveals the 
essential nature of belief, articulating “features that make belief the type of mental 
state that it is” (Wedgwood 2002, 270).  Humberstone writes that “the very 
concept of belief imports its own criterion of success.” (1992, 73)  Shah thinks that 
even “exercising the concept of belief involves accepting that in some sense one 
ought to believe that p only if p is true”, (2003, 449) and Wedgwood later writes 
that the “very nature” of belief “cannot be explained without mentioning 
normative properties and relations.” (2007, 171)   
Whereas the Attempt Model captured belief’s truth aim in terms of the 
believer’s attempt to believe the truth, the Normativist Model locates the truth aim 
in the normativity of belief itself, regardless of the believer’s desires.  At first this 
might seem to be a promising way to avoid the main criticism of the Attempt 
                                                      
12 For other representative views: Shah 2003, Shah and Velleman 2005, and Hieronymi 2006. 
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Model – namely that because epistemic normativity arises from the satisfaction of 
agents’ desires to believe the truth, it struggles to account for the universality of 
epistemic norms.  Since the normativist believes that all beliefs are subject to the 
truth norm there is no similar issue in accounting for universality.  However the 
Attempt Model and the Biological Function Model have an advantage over the 
Normativist Model.  Whereas for the Attempt Model and the Biological Function 
Model normativity can be reduced to desire satisfaction and evolutionary 
advantage and thus understood naturalistically, epistemic normativity on the 
Normativist Model appears to be grounded in a brute irreducible normative fact.  
When we ask what explains our epistemic reasons to believe the truth, the 
Normativist’s answer is that it’s an a priori conceptual truth about belief that it’s 
correct if and only if it’s true.  It isn’t any further value conferred upon believers or 
anything about its biological advantage – the Normativist maintains that epistemic 
normativity simply flows from an irreducible and constitutive feature of belief.   
In addition to the worry that the Normativist Model posits irreducible 
normative facts, it suffers from the same problem as the Biological Function model 
– it’s not clear that simply the fact that belief has a constitutive norm gives us 
reason to think that this norm confers necessary normative authority.  There are 
many norms that arise in relation to the standards set by certain practices.  But 
this doesn’t automatically mean that these norms confer necessary normative 
authority or reasons for compliance.  Again, presumably there are norms that 
articulate standards for torture that don’t give us good reasons to torture.  To put 
it in different words, in keeping with epistemic constitutivism, it must be the case 
on the Normativist Model that epistemic normativity arises from the fact that there 
is a constitutive feature of beliefs such that they are correct if and only if they’re 
true.  But the fact that there is such a norm for belief doesn’t itself mean that there 
is necessary normative reason to have correct beliefs.  Again, the normativist 
might want to argue that there is in fact good reason to have true beliefs because of 
some further fact about the value of true belief – this is a tact that I will explore in 
the next section.  But that will be to depart from the constitutivist explanation.   
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I began this inquiry into epistemic constitutivism in order to find a way to 
make sense of the often-expressed commitment to evaluation of belief in terms of 
its necessary connection with the truth.  The epistemic constitutivists try to 
express this connection in terms of constitutive facts about the nature of belief or 
believers and hold that these constitutive facts about belief explain why epistemic 
evaluation is essential evaluation of belief qua belief.  I argued that none of the 
breeds of constitutivist explanation in the literature succeed in accounting for both 
the universal applicability of epistemic norms and epistemic normativity’s 
supposed necessary normative force that always gives us at least some reason to 
follow epistemic norms.  I turn now to accounts that explain epistemic normativity 
in terms of the value of true belief.    
 
4 The Value of True Belief 
 
Recall that a plausible fallback for the proponent of the Biological Function 
Model was to hold, not that epistemic normativity arises from the very fact that 
beliefs function as they biologically ought to function, but rather that the particular 
function that beliefs have, namely to represent their contents accurately, is good 
for us.  Though this view is a departure from constitutivism in favor of an 
instrumental view of epistemic value, and thus is a prima facie less likely candidate 
to account for epistemic norms’ universal applicability, it does seem to provide a 
natural explanation for the normative authority of epistemic norms.  In this section 
I will consider the instrumental and the final value of true belief in turn.   
 As we saw in exploring the Biological Function Model, it is very common to 
assume that true belief has value.  The question relevant for current purposes is 
how to understand the value of true belief.  In order to explain what grounds our 
epistemic normativity, we must be able to explain how epistemic norms - like 
moral norms, our beginning comparison suggests – give rise to necessary 
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normative force.  In other words, we will try to determine whether the value of 
true belief dictates that epistemic norms always give us at least some reason to 
follow them.   
 To begin, we can acknowledge that true beliefs are very often valuable.  
They help us get to the closest local bike shop, locate the wine opener, and satisfy 
our curiosity about Æthelstan.  Sometimes, though, - like when we’re leaping 
crevasses – it seems like it would clearly be better for us to have a false belief.  So 
in precisely what way is true belief valuable?  Lynch claims that (in addition to true 
belief’s being intrinsically good, a view that we will visit later) true belief is prima 
facie good (2004, 46-47).  This doesn’t say much, though.  Prima facie value is value 
“at first sight” - the implication, of course, that when we look closer we might see 
that that value doesn’t obtain at all.  Lynch also suggests that we can alternatively 
understand true belief’s value as value “other things being equal” (Ibid., 47).  
Hazlett makes a point about the weakness of claims that X is better “other things 
being equal” (2013, 10). He compares a defense of the value of taking cocaine on 
the grounds that, other things being equal, it’s always better to take cocaine.  One 
can’t object to this claim, he says, by pointing out that cocaine is unhealthy or 
addictive, because the claim is that cocaine is good other things being equal.  The 
claim is supposed to tell us that for two people who are the same in terms of health 
and addiction, that then the one who takes cocaine is better off.  But clearly this is 
not an adequate defense of the value of cocaine.  Other things may rarely (or 
never) be equal.  Lynch writes that  
one thing people never tire of reminding me of whenever I claim that 
truth and its pursuit are good is that there are many times when they 
aren’t. The truth can hurt and falsity can have its own rewards. But 
these exceptions hardly show that true belief isn’t good and therefore 
not worth striving for. They are the exceptions that prove the rule. 
(2004, 46)   
Foley writes that it’s “highly improbable that this [false belief turns out to be 
practically rational] will happen frequently”, that it will happen in unusual, but not 
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in “relatively normal situations” (1987, 224), and that “[t]he evidentialist is right to 
insist that ordinarily it is deeply irrational to undertake a project of worsening our 
epistemic situation in hopes of securing a belief that will generate pragmatic or 
long-term intellectual benefits” (1992, 27).  Claims that true belief is usually or 
typically better for us abound.   
 It’s hard to know exactly what to make of these claims.  On interpreting the 
claims that X is “normally” or “generally” or “ordinarily” or “typically” better, 
Hazlett points out that our background theoretical or normative commitments 
routinely affect our judgments about what is normal or typical (2013, 11).  And it 
won’t suffice to defend a claim that X is “normally” better to show that in a 
statistical majority of cases X is better (Ibid., 13). Consider driving on the right side 
of the road.  Though in a majority of cases, driving on the right side of the road is 
the better thing to do to avoid a crash, it doesn’t seem right to say that “normally, 
driving on the right side of the road is better.” Rather, sometimes, like when one’s 
in the UK, it’s better to drive on the left.  That situation isn’t abnormal – after all, it 
happens in regular and predictable circumstances.  Swerving into the left lane to 
avoid an animal is abnormal, but driving on the left in the UK is not.   
 Let’s consider, then, the claim that for any subject and any proposition, true 
belief is normally better than false belief.  We saw that identifying regular and 
predictable patterns of driving on the left is sufficient for the falsity of the claim 
that driving on the right is normally better than driving on the left.  Similarly, to 
determine whether true belief is normally better than false belief, we should look 
for clear and predictable patterns of belief formation in which it’s better for a 
subject to have false beliefs.  In “Evidential Exclusivity, Correctness, and the Nature 
of Belief” I try to show the existence of multiple kinds of doxastic processes that 
clearly and predictably produce beneficial false beliefs.  Here I will summarize 
those findings and suggest a few more.   
 Take a doxastic process to be a way of forming, maintaining, and revising 
one’s beliefs.  Research in cognitive psychology makes clear that, though doxastic 
processes often seem oriented toward reflecting one’s environment accurately, 
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there are also many doxastic processes that are best seen as enhancing agential 
wellbeing.  It seems likely that when epistemic constitutivists conclude that belief 
has built-in features that make it necessarily either conceptually or functionally 
truth-aimed, they might be concentrating on aspects of what it’s like to deliberate 
about the truth about a proposition.  But belief formation happens non-
deliberatively too – automatically, subconsciously, and free from the apparent 
constraints of active deliberation – and so there’s no reason to think that what 
often happens in non-deliberative contexts is any less indicative of the true nature 
of belief.  In non-deliberative contexts, doxastic processes produce beliefs that 
cause agents to view themselves in unrealistically positive terms, think that they 
have more causal control over their environments than they actually have, and 
hold overly optimistic views about the future.13  Cognitive filters of selective 
attention, representation, and recall interact with our doxastic processes to 
influence our beliefs about ourselves and the trajectory of our lives.  We can 
maintain these overly positive beliefs via selective inquiry and selective attention 
to evidence (Buunk et al. 1990; Sedikides and Gregg 2008). 
 In addition to overly positive beliefs about ourselves and our lives, we 
manifest other sorts of doxastic biases that seem to have positive effects on our 
wellbeing.  Stroud, for example, argues that friendship constitutively involves 
epistemic partiality (2006, 499).  She writes that “friendship places demands not 
just on our feelings or our motivations, but on our beliefs and our methods of 
forming beliefs” and that “this epistemic partiality is contrary to the standards of 
epistemic responsibility and justification held up by mainstream epistemological 
theories” (Ibid.).  When we hear unfavorable things said about a friend, she thinks 
that it’s incumbent on us, qua friend, not just to defend our friend outwardly, but 
also inwardly in terms of our beliefs.  So friendship, she thinks  
 
                                                      
13 Tiberius 2008, summarizing Taylor and Brown (1994, 21). 
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yields different doxastic outcomes: different beliefs. I want to claim 
that not just the cognitive procedures we deploy in assessing evidence 
but the set of beliefs we end up with will systematically differ when 
the subject of the story is our friend, and in particular that the latter 
will be more favorable than they otherwise would be. This is the 
second locus of the differential epistemic practices connected with 
friendship: where our friends are concerned, we draw different 
conclusions and make different inferences than we otherwise would 
(or than a detached observer would). I noted above that we spend 
more energy generating, that is, coming up with, alternative—and less 
damning explanations of the reported conduct when the story we’re 
told is about a friend. But that isn’t all, for we are also likely to give 
such alternative constructions greater credence than we would for a 
nonfriend. And at the end of the day we are simply less likely to 
conclude that our friend acted disreputably, or that he is a bad person, 
than we would be in the case of a nonfriend. Friendship seems to alter 
not just the procedures we use to process new information but the 
conclusions we end up drawing. (2006, 506) 
 
Stroud thinks, then, that friendship requires a biased doxastic process – a process 
that systematically produces false beliefs that help sustain it.  Though she argues 
that we owe our friends a kind of epistemic partiality beyond that to which we owe 
strangers, we might think that in fact we would be better off if our thinking in 
regard to the rest of the population also showed a kind of biased deference.  Pace 
writes that  
 
[t]hinking charitably of others…may in fact be a prima facie moral 
obligation…regarding all people. The disposition to think charitably 
of others is often considered a moral and intellectual virtue.  Doing 
so arguably involves requiring less evidence to think well of them 
 32 
and requiring more evidence before one thinks ill of them. (2011, 
258)   
 
It’s less straightforward that being widely charitable towards others has a direct 
impact on our wellbeing in the way that friendship does.  Whereas people often 
think that having friends is partially constitutive of living well, it might be more 
reasonable to argue for the value of believing charitably in a less direct fashion: it 
does seem, however, that thinking charitably of others is morally virtuous and it’s 
common to think that moral virtue is partially constitutive of wellbeing. 
 I’ve suggested that there’s a wide range of kinds of doxastic process that 
produce false beliefs.  Further, these doxastic processes have a host of effects on 
our wellbeing.  Unrealistically positive beliefs about ourselves, inflated beliefs 
about our capacity to control our environment, optimism about the future, and 
having close friendships are all significantly correlated with not being depressed.  
Non-depression, in turn, is linked to higher subjective wellbeing, greater 
motivation, and superior coping abilities.  Collectively, this gives us strong 
evidence that there’s a clear pattern of non-truth-directed belief formation that 
makes our lives go better.   
 It looks then, like believing truly can’t be thought to always or normally be 
better for us than believing falsely.  One might think, though, that to focus 
exclusively on the instrumental value of true belief is to ignore another way that 
true belief might be valuable.  It’s often claimed that true belief has final value.  We 
should interpret this claim to mean that truth always confers value on our beliefs. 
This value is to be understood not in terms of some further benefit that makes a 
belief better for us in virtue of being true, like making it more useful, but rather in 
terms of fundamental final value.  Though it’s notoriously difficult to argue that 
some candidate value does or doesn’t have final value, I will try to argue that we 
have very good reason to think that it does not.     
In order to make sure that the intuitions we elicit are actually about the 
final value of true belief and not the instrumental value of true belief, it’s best to 
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focus the investigation on pointless true beliefs.  Pointless beliefs are beliefs that 
have no impact on our lives.  A common example is the number of grains of sand in 
some stretch of desert or whether the number of blades of grass in some stretch of 
field is even or odd.  We have nothing to gain or lose by having a true belief, a false 
belief, or no belief at all about the number of grains of sand in a quadrant of desert.  
If we think we have good reason to believe that it’s not any better to have a true 
belief than a false belief or no belief about the number of grains of sand, then we 
should conclude that true belief likely does not have final value after all.   
 Kvanvig argues that cases like this are misleading. Because we are not gods 
with limitless resources, we have reasons not to expend energy finding out the 
truth about the number of grains of sand.  But this is not to say that believing the 
truth would not be good.  He appeals to our intuitions in cases in which resources 
are not limited:  
 
We should ask ourselves, regarding possible individuals in such a 
cost-free environment, what the cognitive ideal would involve. Here 
[supporters of the view that truth has final value] have millennia of 
theological reflection on their side.  Part of the cognitive ideal, 
whatever else it may involve, is knowledge of all truths; omniscience 
for short.  But for omniscience to be part of the ideal, no truth can be 
pointless enough to play no role at all in the story of what it takes to 
be cognitively ideal. (2008, 209-210)  
 
On Kvanvig’s view, then, though acquiring the truths might not be worth it, 
omniscience realizes a sort of cognitive ideal.  It would be better, he thinks, to have 
every true belief than to have only the true beliefs that are not pointless.  I don’t 
share the view that having every true belief is better than having only important 
true beliefs.  But that’s not an easy debate to have.  What we can extract from 
Kvanvig’s view is two thoughts that are worth pursuing. First, in cases in which we 
have no other interests or needs we should be motivated to learn the truth about 
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pointless propositions, and second, that that there will be plenty of cases in which 
the value of true belief is overridden by other things that are valuable.  Wrenn, in 
discussing this first thought, writes  
 
Truth…is so good we should want it when it is ‘cost-free.’  This is the 
merest quantum of value. It is distinguishable from neutrality only in 
the fantastical case of someone without cognitive limitations, without 
other concerns, interests or needs, or who somehow gains benefits 
from inquiry that precisely offset the costs involved in pursuing it.  We 
are not like that.  We have cognitive limitations.  We have concerns 
and interests other than truth, and we have needs that can conflict 
with the conduct of inquiry into all questions.  If truth’s intrinsic value 
is invisible except when nothing else is at stake, then truth’s intrinsic 
value might as well always be invisible, and we have no reason to 
think truth is more important than anything else we value. (2017, 
114) 
 
Further, even in cases in which there really are no competing concerns, I don’t 
share the intuition that one ought to be motivated to learn the truth.  It seems that 
true beliefs are better thought of as something that is permissible to value, but not 
necessary to value.  In cases in which someone with no competing concerns were 
unwilling to learn a pointless truth, I see no reason to claim that they are under-
valuing truth.  This suggests that there is no degree to which we ought to value it.   
 On the second thought, Kvanvig acknowledges that there are many cases in 
which we will not pursue true beliefs because of competing values.  It’s worth 
thinking about how true belief does stack up against other values.  Consider other 
candidate final values, such as moral value or pleasure or beauty.  Though it’s 
impossible to strictly quantify exchange rates between values, it looks like 
pointless true beliefs don’t fare very well in comparisons.  It seems 
straightforwardly irrational to prefer even a lot of pointless true beliefs over really 
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any amount of moral value.  I would definitely choose anyone’s not suffering from 
a five minute headache over one thousand true beliefs about grains of sand in 
desert quadrants.  The same goes for units of pleasure or beauty value.  It seems 
difficult to claim that someone who preferred any other final value to huge 
amounts of pointless true belief has done anything improper in their valuing.  
Though I began with a concession as to the difficulty of determining what is or is 
not a final value, I take these to be strong reasons not to view true belief as a final 
value.  
 
5 An axial account of the epistemic and the norms of belief  
I’ve embarked on an investigation into epistemic constitutivism and the value of 
true belief in order to better understand the source of epistemic normativity.  
What I tried to show in my examination of epistemic constitutivism is that each 
type of constitutivist view holds that epistemic evaluation of beliefs is essential 
evaluation of belief – in other words evaluation in accordance with belief’s essence.  
This is the Doxastic Account of the Epistemic.  It makes “epistemic” out to be about 
belief, and it holds the belief state to be properly evaluated in accordance with its 
nature, as a state that is aimed in some way at the truth.  The Attempt Model holds 
that in believing, I necessarily attempt to believe the truth, so essential evaluation 
of belief is evaluation in accordance with the truth norm.  Since the Biological 
Function model holds that truth is the biological proper function of belief it too 
holds that essential evaluation of belief is evaluation with respect to the truth 
norm.  And the Normativist Model builds the truth norm into the very concept of 
belief, thus making epistemic norm-directedness part of what it is to be a belief.   
We began by noting that epistemologists often claim that epistemology 
addresses the question of what we should believe and that epistemologists take 
this question to be a normative question in much the same sense as the ethicist’s 
normative question about what we ought to do.  The “epistemic perspective” that 
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guides epistemology, however, is a perspective that is marked by its direction 
toward truth.  That gives us reason to resist thinking of epistemology’s guiding 
question as “What should I believe?”.  For we have seen that although the 
epistemic perspective privileges a truth-directed answer to that question, neither 
epistemic constitutivist arguments nor arguments about the instrumental or final 
value of true belief should lead us to conclude that belief norms are similarly truth-
directed.   
Neither should we claim that epistemic norms are normative in the very 
same sense as moral norms.  Whereas we can see moral norms as making 
necessary claims on us – as generating necessary normative force and always 
providing us with at least some reason to follow them – the views of epistemic 
normativity that we have investigated fail to account for epistemic norms’ 
necessary normative force.  The Attempt Model does not give us a normative 
reason, for each proposition, to believe the truth, because it’s not the case that 
every belief is an attempt by the believer to believe the truth.  The Biological 
Function Model does not give us a normative reason, for each proposition, to 
believe the truth because proper functions don’t deliver necessary normative 
force.  And the Normativist Model also fails to necessarily provide us with reasons 
because “correctness qua belief” does not produce necessary normative force 
either.  Neither, I’ve tried to argue, is it the case that the instrumental or final value 
of true belief always provides normative force and always provides us with some 
reason to follow epistemic norms.   
I’ve argued that we should resist both commonly made assumptions about 
the epistemic domain.  Where does this leave us with respect to understanding the 
nature of belief and what does properly demarcate the epistemic domain?  The 
Doxastic Account of the Epistemic defines the epistemic in terms of belief.  I’ve 
tried to suggest that such a conception is very common in epistemology.  We saw it 
in play in Schroeder’s distinction between epistemic reasons, which he treated as 
reasons for belief, and practical reasons, which were treated as reasons for action.  
We should resist such a conception because it bars the very possibility of non- 
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truth-directed answers to the question of what we should believe.  It also serves to 
bar other conceptions of what can be a proper subject of epistemic reasons.  On the 
Doxastic Account of the Epistemic, epistemic reasons just are reasons for belief, so 
we are less inclined to think broadly about epistemic reasons for mental attitudes 
other than belief or epistemic reasons for actions.   
A better alternative, I think is an axial account of the epistemic.  Such an 
account understands the epistemic domain in terms of value.  We think of truth 
and knowledge and understanding as valuable epistemic goods.  On this 
conception, epistemic norms are directed toward the acquisition of such goods.  An 
axial account does not posit a fundamental contrast between the epistemic and the 
practical so as to allow for epistemic reasons for action – “How should we conduct 
our inquiry?” and practical reasons for belief – “What would it be better for me to 
believe about the cause of my son’s death?”  Instead, the epistemic domain is more 
informatively contrasted with other domains of value, like the moral or aesthetic 
domains.      
 Our inquiry into the value of true belief highlighted the existence of many 
types of doxastic process that, when they are functioning in ways that reliably 
contribute to agential wellbeing, predictably produce false beliefs.  Though we may 
well ultimately find it better to eschew all talk of the “aim of belief”, we can at least 
recognize that these processes don’t seem to be truth-aimed.  The correlation 
between these doxastic processes and significant effects on motivation and 
subjective wellbeing suggest that we must abandon any conception of the 
normativity of belief that holds that necessarily or constitutively beliefs are to be 
categorized or evaluated exclusively in accordance with a truth connection.   
What, then, should we take to be normative for the state of belief?  In one 
sense, I think recognizing belief’s full functional role can help steer us away from 
incorrect views of belief’s normativity.  Though a neat account of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of belief likely remains outside our grasp, we can at least 
identify a collection of central functional properties.  These properties include 
belief’s inferential relationship to other beliefs, its relationship to perception, its 
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role in assertation, and importantly, I think, its role in motivation.  I take William 
James’ idea that thinking is designed for doing to be a helpful backdrop in 
constructing a theory of belief, and I think part of what cognitive psychology has 
shown us is that non-truth-aimed processes very often help us do better.  This is in 
large part due to their role in motivation.  By seeing ourselves in more positive 
lights, thinking that we have greater causal impact on our trajectories, and 
remaining optimistic about the future – despite the fact that such positive beliefs 
are often unwarranted - we are motivated to remain engaged in our lives and with 
our friends.  This, then, could lead us to an account of belief’s normativity that is 
directed not toward truth, but toward informing our practical cognition in ways 
that stably contribute to wellbeing.  I think such a conception is helpful in that it 
highlights a contrast with the received view that beliefs are necessarily truth-
aimed.  On the other hand, we might side with David Papineau who thinks that 
there is no distinctive species of normativity that attaches to belief.  I think in some 
sense this view is also importantly right.  He writes  
 
I do not of course wish to deny that there are some valid prescriptions 
that apply to the adoption of beliefs. However…these are always 
prescriptions of a kind that arise in connection with other human 
activities as well as belief-formation. More specifically,…all such 
prescriptions arise from considerations of moral value, or personal 
value, or possibly aesthetic value, and not from any distinct species of 
doxastic value. (2013, 64) 
 
So although understanding the belief state in both theoretical and practical 
contexts might require that we actively attempt to shift our understanding 
of its normativity away from truth exclusivity and towards its contribution 
to practical cognition, it also seems true that it might not always be helpful 
to consider a domain of uniquely doxastic value.  In this sense our 
theorizing about belief will mirror our theorizing about action.  Though we 
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often want to ask about norms of action in the moral domain or prudential 
domain and give answers that depend on moral or prudential value, we 
don’t often think that such answers will be captured in terms of a unique 
domain of “action value”.  The domain of belief seems similar.  Regardless of 
whether we opt for a specific characterization of belief norms, I hope to 
have shown the problematic nature of the Doxastic Account of the 
Epistemic.  Epistemic norms are not the norms of belief, and belief norms 
cannot be taken to be necessarily truth-directed.    
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Chapter 2 - Evidential Exclusivity, Correctness, and the Nature 
of Belief 
 
Introduction 
 
Recently epistemologists have focused on a pair of claims that seem to be true 
about doxastic deliberation.  The first, Evidential Exclusivity, says that in doxastic 
deliberation, only what are taken to be evidential considerations can play a role as 
motivating reasons to have a doxastic attitude toward a proposition p.  The second, 
Transparency, says that in doxastic deliberation, the first-personal question 
“whether to belief that p” immediately and non-inferentially gives way to the 
question “whether p”.  These claims have figured prominently in the literature that 
attempts to elucidate the “aim of belief”, in the literature that describes our 
epistemic deontic obligations and how they arise, and has even been used to argue 
for the necessity of metaethical realism.  In this paper, I’m going to focus on the 
way in which Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency have been taken to be 
evidence for the truth of a certain proposal about the nature of belief, namely that 
it has a standard of correctness that holds that a belief that p is correct if and only 
if p is true.  Epistemologists have claimed that the best explanation for why 
Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency hold for agents engaged in doxastic 
deliberation is that during deliberation, agents deploy the belief concept and that 
belief’s constitutive standard is that it’s correct iff it’s true.  The plan for the paper 
is as follows:  In section 1, I’ll explain Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency, 
clarify their relationship to one another, and show how they’re taken to arise from 
and be explained by belief’s standard of correctness.  In section 2, I’ll highlight two 
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observations about Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency: first, the apparent 
possibility of deliberate suspension in cases of roughly balanced evidence, and 
second, the apparent possibility of reasonable divergence in synchronic and 
diachronic judgments about the normative status of a belief.  Whereas the first 
observation can be taken to be a possible counterexample to EE/T, the second can 
be thought of as a feature of belief formation that the Standard of Correctness 
proposal leaves unexplained. Though my aim is not to deny EE/T, I want to draw 
attention to these two points because I think that the alternative explanation that I 
ultimately endorse will do a better job accounting for these data than the proposed 
standard of correctness.  In Section 3 I will take a closer look at the Standard of 
Correctness proposal and propose a distinction between two ways of interpreting 
the standard’s normative force. I will show how epistemologists have assumed that 
the weaker of the two distinguished normative senses acts as a kind of fallback 
position – even if sense can’t be made of how the Standard of Correctness gives 
rise to a stronger breed of normative force, belief seems at the very least to be 
subject to a standard of correctness that holds true in the weaker sense.  In Section 
4 I will attempt to make out what the weaker interpretation of the standard of 
correctness amounts to via an analogy to norms of etiquette and I’ll argue that we 
have reason to doubt even this weaker interpretation.  Finally, in Section 5, we’ll 
put together the pieces: I’ll suggest that we can come up with an alternative 
explanation of how EE/T might arise that will account for both of the observations 
that the Correctness proposal left unexplained and will succeed where the 
Correctness proposal failed - in accounting for the core features of belief’s 
functional profile, not just its role in deliberation.        
1 A Pair of Claims about Doxastic Deliberation 
It’s a well-appreciated fact that the beliefs we form don’t always reflect our 
evidence. Multiple psychological mechanisms are implicated in belief formation 
and some are truth-independent.  Often we form beliefs that we wish were true, 
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but for which we have very little evidence.  Yet even though this kind of causal 
route to belief formation is widely acknowledged, it also seems clear that only 
certain kinds of reflections on what to believe can succeed in directly bringing it 
about that we believe.  So although we recognize that it often happens that we, say, 
believe in accordance with what we desire to be true even though we have 
insufficient evidence for that belief, reflecting on facts about what we desire alone 
cannot be the reason for which we form a belief.  Rather, it seems that the 
reflections that are able to directly give rise to beliefs during deliberation are 
exclusively evidential considerations.  Call this claim Evidential Exclusivity. 
 
Evidential Exclusivity: In doxastic deliberation, only what are taken to 
be evidential considerations can play a role as motivating reasons to 
have a doxastic attitude toward a proposition p.14   
 
A closely related claim, Transparency, tells us something about the phenomenology 
of conscious deliberation about whether to believe: 
  
Transparency: In doxastic deliberation, the first-personal question 
“whether to believe that p immediately, non-inferentially gives way to 
the question “whether p.”15   
 
Whenever we ask ourselves whether or not to believe some particular proposition, 
we immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering 
the question whether that proposition is true.  Nishi Shah’s proposed explanation 
of the phenomenon of transparency is to suggest that it is part of the concept of 
belief that it has a certain standard of correctness: 
  
                                                      
14 Steglich-Petersen 2009; McHugh 2015; Sharadin 2016. 
15 Transparency was introduced by Evans 1982 and revisited by Moran 2001. This formulation comes 
from Shah and Velleman 2005.   
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(SC) Belief that p is correct iff16 it is true that p, and incorrect iff it is 
untrue that p. (Shah 2013, 3)   
 
In other words, it is a conceptual truth that the standard of correctness for belief is 
truth.  Here’s how Shah thinks (SC) explains Transparency.   
 
1. During doxastic deliberation, one’s thinking is guided by the 
question “whether to believe that p”. 
2. So, during doxastic deliberation, one necessarily employs the 
concept of belief.   
3. So, during doxastic deliberation, one necessarily takes one’s 
potential belief that p to be correct iff p is true. 
4. So, during doxastic deliberation, one necessarily takes the question 
“whether to believe that p” to give way to the question “whether p 
is true”.  
 
Why is it that reflection on the evidence that p but not on my desire that p be true 
can bring me to believe that p? Because, according to Shah, our reflection about 
what to believe is structured by our acceptance of the norm (SC).  The (SC) norm 
explains the evidential constraint on deliberation about what to believe because 
that norm is contained in the very concept of belief.   
If Transparency is a claim about the phenomenology of deliberation and 
Exclusivity is a psychological claim about what kinds of considerations can play the 
role of motivating reasons during deliberation, how, precisely, are the two claims 
related?  If one takes evidence to consist in considerations that are relevant to 
determining the truth of p, or in other words, considerations that are relevant to 
                                                      
16 There’s a lot of debate in the literature about the content of (SC), in particular whether the norm 
should say “iff” or “only if”.  There are reasons to prefer “only if” because it seems like we shouldn’t 
believe everything that’s true, for example all trivial entailments of our beliefs that no finite cognitive 
machine could ever support.  I’m not going to get into these debates in this paper and will go with 
Shah’s “iff”.   
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answering the question “whether p is true”, then one can derive Exclusivity: In the 
context of first-personal doxastic deliberation, the question “whether to believe 
that p” is always settled by evidential considerations alone.  Since only evidential 
considerations can settle “whether p”, then only evidential considerations can 
settle deliberation over “whether to believe p”. Transparency thus entails 
Exclusivity.    
 Transparency, for Shah, is a necessary truth.  He writes that “so long as one 
is considering the deliberative question of what to believe, these two questions 
must be answered by, and answerable to, the same set of considerations.”  He says 
that the “seamless shift in focus from belief to truth is not a quirky feature of 
human psychology, but something that is demanded by the nature of first-personal 
doxastic deliberation” (2003, 447).    Shah goes on to argue that belief’s standard of 
correctness provides an argument for Evidentialism, namely a position he takes to 
hold that “only evidence can be a reason for belief” and claims that the best way to 
gloss the correctness standard is via the deontic modal: “One ought to believe that 
p if and only if p is true.”  In Section 3 I will take up the issue of how we should 
interpret (SC)’s normative import. For now, though, I want to make two 
observations about Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency that I think merit 
further attention.        
2 Two observations about Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency 
1.  Recall that Evidential Exclusivity claims that only what are taken to be 
evidential considerations can play a role as motivating reasons to have any 
doxastic attitude towards a proposition.  Whereas this likely strikes us as plausible 
when we consider the reasons that motivate us to form a belief that p or to reject a 
belief that p (form a belief that not-p), it seems that one often has some discretion 
in whether or not to have the doxastic attitude of suspension on p.  In other words, 
it seems that in some cases of reflection on whether p, we can deliberately choose 
between suspending belief or believing that p for presumably non-evidential 
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reasons. Conor McHugh, in his 2015 paper “The Illusion of Exclusivity”, suggests a 
few kinds of cases which he thinks serve as counterexamples to Exclusivity.  He 
takes them to share an important feature, namely that they’re all cases in which the 
evidence at a deliberator’s disposal is sufficient to permit belief.  Nate Sharadin 
(2016), in another paper that aims to provide a counter-example to Exclusivity, 
argues that non-evidential considerations can play a role in certain cases of 
roughly balanced evidence.17  The proposal up for consideration, then, is whether in 
cases of sufficient or roughly balanced evidence one sometimes has the capacity to 
suspend belief on the basis of non-evidential considerations.  Consider the 
following two cases: 
 
Testimony: When we receive testimony that p, it seems as though we 
often have a choice about whether to accept that testimony and 
believe that p or instead raise for ourselves the possibility that the 
testifier, even one whom we might generally take to be highly reliable, 
is mistaken or deceiving us.  If we elect to concentrate on the latter 
possibilities, we can deliberately suspend belief about p until we’re 
able to rule these possibilities out.  Otherwise we can decide to ignore 
the possibility that the testimony is incorrect and go on to believe that 
p.        
 
Inductive generalizations: When we set out to gather evidence, it can 
seem like a choice whether or not we’ve witnessed enough instances 
of a certain type to believe the truth of an inductive generalization or 
whether to go on seeking further confirmation that there isn’t an 
exception to the generalization.  As a matter of psychological fact, it 
often seems to us that we have discretion in whether to believe some 
inductive proposition or to suspend belief on that proposition and 
                                                      
17 Sharadin’s proposed counterexample in his “Nothing but the Evidential Considerations” (2016) 
involves auto-alethic beliefs. 
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search for further proof.  A particular breed of this kind of case is 
familiar to us from the contextualism and pragmatic encroachment 
literature.  Whether or not we believe that the bank is open at noon 
on Saturday or we suspend belief about its Saturday hours seems to 
vary with the practical stakes.   
 
The reason I raise the possibility of these cases of apparent deliberate suspension 
is not because I’m interested in denying Exclusivity and Transparency, but rather 
because I want to note carefully the situations in which they appear to falter in 
order to gain insight into what might be going on behind the scenes in the doxastic 
processes that produce these beliefs – information that will help us go on to 
construct an alternative hypothesis.  After all, the supporters of EE/T are surely 
right that these claims obtain sufficiently frequently and widely so as to warrant an 
explanation – even if they’re not correct to hold that they’re necessarily true for all 
doxastic attitudes.  In addition, I would be happy to interpret the Standard of 
Correctness explanation as a conditional claim: If Evidential Exclusivity and 
Transparency are true, the best explanation for their truth is that belief has a 
standard of correctness, such that a belief that p is correct iff p is true.       
  
2.  Above I noted that in cases of apparently sufficient or roughly balanced 
evidence, it can seem to us as if our evidence licenses but does not compel belief, 
thus allowing us to deliberately suspend on p or believe that p. For the second 
observation, I want to draw attention to an aspect of our diachronic doxastic 
judgment that I think must be appreciated alongside our analysis of synchronic 
deliberation if we are to properly evaluate the (SC) proposal.  This is the apparent 
divergence in synchronic and diachronic judgments about the normative status of 
our beliefs.  To begin, note that Shah seems to vacillate between descriptive and 
normative formulations of Transparency.  In some cases he claims that the two 
questions (“whether to believe p” and “whether p is true”) are always taken to be 
answered or settled by the same set of considerations (2003, 447, 463).  In other 
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instances the claim seems to be normative: The two questions “must” be seen as 
being answered by the same set of considerations. (Ibid., 447, 453).  Shah is quick 
to acknowledge that the way in which evidential considerations are decisive is 
unique to doxastic deliberation – when we’re not consciously reflecting on what to 
believe, we sometimes believe for non-evidential reasons.  But in keeping with his 
normative formulation of transparency and his judgment that (SC) is a norm of 
belief, he, in familiar epistemological company, follows the tradition of taking 
beliefs that are formed in accordance with non-evidential reasons to be defective if 
predictable.  I want to highlight that it’s unclear that we do uniformly resist 
normative endorsement of beliefs that aren’t true once we widen our lens from the 
synchronic judgment of beliefs during deliberation to the diachronic judgment of 
beliefs as embedded in certain doxastic processes that are parts of a complete 
doxastic economy.   
To make this thought clear, we might think about the following kind of 
thought experiment.  Consider an agent who is asked about the normative status of 
a belief p about which she deliberates at time t.  Presumably, according to Shah and 
in accordance with EE/T, her verdict is that she will/ought endorse that belief p iff 
she takes it to accord with the evidence at her disposal.  Now in contrast to the 
synchronic judgment that we elicit, I want to think about what we might take to be 
a reasonable judgment about the normative status of some kinds of beliefs that are 
embedded in a diachronic picture.  To do this, we should examine the role that 
certain doxastic processes seem to routinely play in our cognitive lives. 
To begin, think of a doxastic process as a way of forming, maintaining, and 
revising one’s beliefs.  As EE/T make clear, deliberation appears to be a kind of 
doxastic process that focuses agents on evidential considerations – considerations 
that are relevant to adopting true beliefs.  When we survey a wider array of 
doxastic processes, however, we notice that there are many that seem to be 
directed toward a different end – an end that we might broadly characterize as 
enhancing that agent’s wellbeing.   
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Valerie Tiberius’ work treats the role of positive illusions in human 
psychology (2008, 113).  Summarizing Taylor and Brown’s studies (1994, 21), she 
writes that the doxastic processes that produce these positive illusions cause 
agents to  
 
a) view themselves in unrealistically positive terms;  
b) believe that they have greater control over their environmental 
events than is actually the case; and 
c) hold views of the future that are more optimistic than base-rate 
data can justify. 
 
Let’s look more closely at each of these claims. a) is known as the familiar self-
enhancement bias.  That most people exhibit self-enhancement bias is an 
uncontroversial claim in psychology.18  Self-enhancement bias refers to the way in 
which humans’ beliefs about themselves manifest bias in favor of a positive self-
conception.  Studies find that most peoples’ self-evaluations fail to correspond with 
the evaluations of other people (Gosling et al. 1998), with experts (Helgeson and 
Taylor 1993), and with objective measures (Vazire 2010).  People rate themselves 
more positively and less negatively than they rate most other people in terms of 
(to highlight just a few) physical attractiveness, intelligence, athletic ability, social 
competence, sincerity, being considerate, being rude, and being superficial.19   
 B) targets a kind of causal attribution bias that people routinely display.  
Most people take themselves to possess a higher degree of control over events in 
the world than they actually possess.  In a group of studies, subjects are asked to 
predict the outcomes of a series of coin tosses, to estimate their ability to predict 
the outcome of coin tosses in general, and to indicate the degree to which they 
believed that they were able to improve their ability to predict the outcomes with 
                                                      
18 Hazlett’s Chapter 2 “Greatness of Mind” (2013) is a great overview of the evidence for and role of self-
enhancement bias that I’ve relied on heavily.  See Taylor and Brown (1994), Armor and Taylor (2002), 
Tiberius (2008) and McKay and Dennett (2009) for others.    
19 Dunning (1995), Trafimow et al. (2004), Hazlett (2013). 
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practice.  Subjects’ perceived outcomes were manipulated so that their beliefs 
about their success trajectories varied from seeing themselves as initially 
successful but later unsuccessful, to initially unsuccessful and later successful, or 
neither of these.  All subjects were “correct” in their prediction 50% of the time.  
Initially successful candidates were far likelier to rate themselves as significantly 
better at predicting than were initially unsuccessful candidates, who were far 
likelier to claim that the ability to predict could not be improved with practice.  
Across all three groups, 25% claimed their predictions could be hampered with 
distractions and 40% felt that their ability to predict could be improved with 
practice. These beliefs also manifested in peoples’ related betting behavior (Hazlett 
2013, Langer and Roth 1975).  A closely related phenomenon is the familiar 
manner in which we over-estimate the degree of control we have over our 
successes and under-estimate the control we have over our failures.  We’re likelier 
to attribute our failures to land a job to the randomness of the job market or the 
fluke glass that we dropped during the interview than to our philosophical 
incompetence or the weakness of our writing sample.   
C) picks out the way in which we have overly optimistic views about the 
future.  Studies find that our comparative estimates of our chances of experiencing 
particular life events are strongly correlated with the valence of the event in 
question.  For example, college-aged students estimate their chances of owning a 
home to be 44% higher than the average chance of their classmates and their 
chance of getting divorced as 48% lower than their average classmate (Eppley and 
Dunning 2006).  These differences are significantly correlated neither with the 
general probability of the event in question, the perceived general probability of 
the event, nor the subject’s “personal experience with the type of event in 
question” (Hazlett 2013, 48).     
Buunk et al. (1990) and Sedikides and Gregg (2008) note that we can look 
to the way in which cognitive filters of selective attention, representation, and 
recall interact with our doxastic processes to influence the doxastic outputs of the 
believer.  Overly positive beliefs about ourselves can be maintained via selective 
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inquiry and selective attention to evidence, in which we seek out positive 
information and avoid negative information, and dwell on evidence that positively 
represents us and avoid attending to evidence that reflects negatively on us.  And 
studies have found that most people have “differential processing and recall 
speeds” for positive and negative information – in other words, we recall and 
process positive information more rapidly than negative information (Mele 2001).   
One may respond to the above facts about our doxastic biases by concluding 
that peoples’ lives, or at least their cognitive lives, are going pretty poorly.  We 
might think that we’re all far from being ideal thinkers and most of us are far from 
any reasonable conception of flourishing, so it should come as no surprise that we 
have a lot of false beliefs.  Or we might think, more modestly, that even if our lives 
aren’t so bad overall, that the false beliefs that we have constitute ways in which 
our beliefs are defective, so at least in this sense they contribute to our lives going 
worse.   
These intuitions gain support by focusing on the value of self-awareness.  
Self-awareness helps give us a sense of what would makes our lives go well.  It can 
help us cultivate the habits required to make the choices that are more likely to be 
satisfying and to be more effective in the pursuit of our goals.  Tiberius recognizes 
the value of self-awareness and sees it as an essential part of a general conception 
of wisdom.  However she describes self-awareness as including “the skills and 
commitments that are necessary for acquiring self-knowledge and for constructing 
a self-conception that befits one’s own view about how to live without destroying 
the harmless illusions we have about ourselves that make life better” (2008, 111, 
emphasis mine). Because Tiberius recognizes that having a systematically elevated 
conception of our abilities is “correlated with contentment…the ability to care for 
and about others, openness to new ideas and people, creativity, the ability to 
perform creative and productive work, and the ability to grow, develop, and self-
actualize, especially in response to stressful events”, she concludes that “too 
much…self-knowledge in many contexts seems to have some serious 
disadvantages” and that reflective wisdom requires the capacity to know when it 
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makes sense to adopt a perspective that focuses on the “importance of close 
attention to one’s motivations and a commitment to get at the truth of oneself” 
(Ibid., 115). 
The thought mentioned above, then, - namely that false beliefs necessarily 
contribute to our lives going worse, - is implausible.  To see this more clearly, 
consider the correlation between depression and the doxastic biases that we’ve 
just considered.  Depression includes a variety of symptoms, some cognitive 
(negative self-conception, negative expectations), some emotional (dejected mood, 
self-dislike, loss of gratification), some motivational (loss of motivation, suicidal 
desires), and some somatic (loss of appetite, loss of libido) (Hazlett 2013, Beck and 
Alford 2009).  Self-enhancement bias (Brown 1993), inflated beliefs about one’s 
control over one’s environment (Taylor et al. 1994), and unrealistic optimism 
(Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd 2001) are all highly significantly correlated with 
non-depression.  And whereas non-depressed people recall and process positive 
information more rapidly than they recall and process negative information, 
people with depression do not show this trait.  Hazlett (2013) calls the thesis that 
“non-depressed people’s beliefs about themselves tend to be inaccurate and 
manifest self-enhancement bias” non-depressive unrealism (53).  He goes on to cite 
studies that claim that the higher self-esteem characteristic of non-depressive 
unrealism is correlated with higher subjective wellbeing,20 greater motivation,21 
and superior coping abilities.22 
It wouldn’t be interesting for the (SC) proposal that this paper considers to 
point out that some false beliefs are beneficial.  But I think what would be 
consequential is if we could show that there exist patterns of belief formation that 
                                                      
20 There seems to be a causal connection between SEB and subjective well-being. Consider studies that 
show that subjects’ mood states vary based on whether they engage in self-serving causal attributions 
following the performance of a task (McFarland and Ross 1982), subjects’ levels of optimism predicted 
their levels of postpartum depression (Carver and Gaines 1987) and subjects’ moods could be elevated 
by engaging in positively biased social comparisons (Gibbons 1986).  
21 Subjects with overly positive self-images work harder and longer on tasks and are more able to 
complete tasks. 
22 Buunk et al. (1990) finds biased social comparison to be correlated with diminished stress, anxiety, 
hopelessness and depression in response to negative life events.  
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systematically, predictably, and beneficially produce false beliefs.  For then we 
would need to proceed carefully in order to spell out the notion of correctness in 
play when we claim that necessarily, correct beliefs are true beliefs.   
I tried in this section to show that this state of doxastic affairs is indeed 
plausible.  Recall that our aim in setting off on this detour through the literature on 
belief formation was to set ourselves up to consider a particular question: namely 
whether there might be a difference in our normative judgments in cases of 
doxastic deliberation and in cases in which we reflect on the role that beliefs that 
are the output of some particular doxastic processes seem to play in our overall 
wellbeing.  Here’s my claim: Imagine that we point to some belief that’s embedded 
in a doxastic process that’s systematically correlated with enhanced subjective 
wellbeing, motivational benefits, improved coping capacities, and non-depression.  
If we ask someone whether or not they normatively endorse that belief, I maintain 
that, at the very least, it would be reasonable for that person to respond 
affirmatively. EE/T take as their data our judgments in instances of deliberation to 
draw conclusions about the norm to which belief is subject.  I think we must 
include our observations about divergent diachronic normative judgments in our 
assessment of the data we will use to inform ourselves about belief’s features and 
standards.  We will keep this data point in mind as we go on to consider belief’s 
Standard of Correctness proposal and formulate an alternative story.   
3 The Standard of Correctness Proposal  
Recall that Shah and Velleman think that the best explanation for EE/T is that 
when we deliberate we deploy the concept of belief, which has a constitutive 
standard of correctness such that a belief is correct iff it’s true.  How should we 
interpret the normativity of such a standard?  As mentioned in Section 1, Shah 
thinks this standard can be understood as entailing a corresponding claim about 
what we ought to believe – we ought to believe p iff p is true.  Here are some other 
takes on the normativity of belief’s standard of correctness:   
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Gibbard: For belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief.  
My belief that snow is white is correct just in case the belief is true, 
just in case snow is white. Correctness, now, seems normative…The 
correct belief seems to be the one a subject ought…in this sense, to 
have. (2005, 338)  
 
McHugh: When we say that someone has an incorrect belief, we do 
not seem to be merely describing some feature of her, or of her belief 
– a feature whose presence she could sensibly remain unconcerned 
by.  We are saying that she believes wrongly. (2017, 1452) 
 
Wedgwood: According to the assumption…that “correctness” is a 
normative concept, if your belief is incorrect, it has a certain sort of 
defect – while if your belief is correct, it is wholly free from that defect. 
(2013, 218)  
 
Engel: The term “correctness” here is meant to characterize 
normativity in the broad sense…According to (CT),23 the basic 
dimension of evaluation of the correctness of belief is truth…When 
our beliefs are false, they do not simply lack the property of being true 
or of being fitted in the proper way to the world: they are incorrect 
and in need of correction…(CT) not only tells us when a belief is true 
or false: it tells us that it is right to believe what is true, and that to fail 
at having true belief is in some sense wrong. (2013, 33) 
  
When Gibbard tells us that the correct beliefs are the ones a subject ought to have, 
McHugh and Engel tell us that believers who believe falsely believe wrongly in a 
                                                      
23 Engel’s (CT): For any P, a belief that is P is correct if and only if P is true (2013). 
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sense in which they couldn’t sensibly fail to care about it and Wedgwood tells us 
that false beliefs are necessarily defective, a strong view about the normative 
implications of correctness begins to emerge.  This might seem to contrast, though, 
with other applications of the generic notion of correctness.  Consider the 
following: 
 
• The correctness or incorrectness of an artistic rendering of a 
skeleton based on its anatomical features 
• The correctness of a photographic representation based on its 
likeness to its subject 
• The correctness of an orchestral score as fixed by a set of notes 
• The correctness of a map as fixed by the similarity between the map 
and the terrain it represents 
 
The properties these standards target at least appear to be descriptive, not 
normative.  We might think that Dretske has a similar idea in mind about belief’s 
relationship with truth.  He writes 
  
Beliefs and judgments must either be true or false, yes, but there is 
nothing normative about truth and falsity. What makes a judgment 
false or true is the fact that it fails or succeeds in corresponding to the 
facts, and failing or succeeding in corresponding to the facts is, as far 
as I can see, a straightforward factual matter. Nothing normative 
about it. (2001, 247)  
 
According to Dretske, the fact that a belief can be true or false is a general 
descriptive principle of belief, but one that carries no normative force – 
presumably he thinks that it carries no weight in terms of how a believer should 
believe.  Alternatively, we might acknowledge that on its face belief’s standard of 
correctness appears to express a norm, but think in the spirit of Dretske’s claim 
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that this norm carries no normative force.  One way to put this is that belief’s 
standard of correctness is a norm that doesn’t give rise to reasons.  How might we 
articulate such a view?   
To start, notice that norms are born easily.  I can create a norm that holds 
that all trips to the bathroom during paper-writing sessions must be completed on 
one foot.  We should think, though, that the mere fact that I’ve decreed such a rule 
doesn’t yet give anyone any good reason to act in accordance with it.24  Etiquette, 
the mafia, hipsterdom, and serial killing all plausibly have associated bodies of 
norms or standards, yet don’t necessarily give rise to good reasons to follow them.  
So we can recognize that all norms trivially set standards according to which 
things are permissible, prohibited, good, bad, and the like and simultaneously 
acknowledge that these standards do not necessarily give rise to good reasons to 
act in accordance with them.  As Côté-Bouchard puts it,  
 
If a norm N forbids -ing under conditions C, then trivially, -ing 
under C is forbidden, incorrect, wrong, or bad relative to the standard 
set by N.  However, the descriptive norm-relative question of what is 
permitted or required according to N is distinct from the normative 
question of what there is good or genuinely normative reasons to do. 
(2016, 3182, emphasis his)  
 
On the picture I’m endorsing, reasons come about in accordance with value. 25 So,  
 
                                                      
24 If we feel that some such norm does exert at least a small pull on us, we should consider a diagnosis 
that looks at a kind of derivative force that comes about from the role that norms tend to play in the 
societies we inhabit.  But the important difference is that the normativity at issue in such a case would 
be merely derivative, not arising from the content of the norm itself.    
25 McGuire (2016) gives a comprehensive overview of a value-based theory of reasons and takes the 
following claim to be an analysis of what it is to be a reason.  I take McGuire’s view to be a substantive 
view about reasons, but one that I think is independently preferable for reasons I can’t explore in this 
paper.       
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For any fact x that holds that some action  would promote some state 
of affairs S, x is a reason to  iff, and due to the facts that,  would 
promote S and S is valuable.   
 
This gives a nice explanation of why not all norms necessarily give rise to reasons 
to follow them.  Presumably we think norms of serial killing set standards about 
what is encouraged or discouraged relative to those norms, but that those norms 
don’t give rise to reasons because serial killing is not valuable (/is positively 
disvaluable).   
 To help us think further about the normativity that undergirds belief’s 
standard of correctness, I want to combine our value-based picture of reasons with 
a related distinction between two kinds of normativity.  A number of normativity 
theorists have made use of a breed of the distinction I’m targeting.  Schroeder 
(2003), for one, distinguishes two senses of norms. In the first sense there are 
norms of categorization or classification schemes that divide actions or events into 
distinct types, or that act as general principles of description.  In a second sense, 
are norms as what he calls force-makers. Norms in this second sense act as 
prescriptions or governance principles that guide our actions or give us aims to 
follow (2003, 3).   
Parfit makes use of a similar distinction between norms that he calls rule-
implying and norms that he calls reason-implying.  For Parfit, “facts are normative 
in the rule-implying sense when these facts are about what is correct or incorrect, 
or allowed or disallowed, by some rule or requirement in some practice or 
institution” (2011, 309). He takes as examples of facts that are normative in the 
rule-implying sense that certain acts are illegal, that some act would be bad 
etiquette, or the wrong use of a word, or an impermissible move in chess or some 
other game. He goes on to say that “we can describe in non-normative terms what 
is involved when such social rules and practices are established…and when certain 
acts break these rules, that’s what it is for these acts to be disallowed or incorrect 
in these ways.” Parfit thinks we can’t make similar claims about what it is for there 
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to be a norm that gives us a reason. The reason-implying sense, in contrast, tells us 
what we “should or ought to do” (Ibid.). Parfit’s rule-implying sense of norms maps 
nicely onto Schroeder’s first sense of norms, and his reason-implying sense of 
norms maps nicely onto Schroeder’s second sense of norms as force-makers. 
 We have in place, then, a distinction between norms that are individuated 
by the existence of a rule or practice that don’t necessarily give rise to reasons to 
follow them, and norms that necessarily give us some reason to follow them.  Call 
the first kind the “weak sense” and the second kind the “strong sense”.  Of course 
norms of the two types often overlap.  Good examples are many legal norms and 
moral norms that both give us good reasons to act and involve or depend on moral 
rules or requirements.  We might even hold a meta-normative view on which all 
norms in the strong sense entail normativity in the weak sense.  But the important 
thing to note for our present purposes is that there can exist norms in the weak 
sense that don’t necessarily give rise to normativity in the strong sense.    
 What, then, is the sense of normativity at stake in (SC)? The above 
distinction gives us a way to think about the notion of correctness in play in belief’s 
standard of correctness more clearly.  The theorists quoted at the beginning of the 
section (Gibbard, McHugh, Wedgwood, Engel and in addition, Shah and Velleman) 
all endorse breeds of force-making, action-directing, reason-implying normativity 
of the strong sense.  But although Shah and these other normativists take (SC) to 
apply to belief necessarily, I think when we combine our understanding of norms 
as force-makers and reason-givers only when they promote states of affairs with 
value, then we can see our way towards an argument that correctness can’t in fact 
pick out the strong sense of normativity.  For the considerations about doxastic 
processes from the second part of Section 2 give us good reason to think that the 
states of affairs that have most value are often ones in which we do not believe 
truly.  Since the value in -ing explains what reasons we have to , and in some 
cases it appears as if believing truly does not give rise to a valuable state of affairs, 
then it can’t be the case that the correctness in play in (SC) is normative in the 
strong sense that necessarily gives rise to reasons to follow it.   
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 One might think that this this way of putting things commits the strong 
sense normativists about correctness to too much.  Plausibly they take themselves 
to be committed merely to the claim that (SC) necessarily bestows some action-
guiding force, or some reason to believe p iff p is true.  Surely we shouldn’t commit 
them to the view that they take (SC) to necessarily give rise to an all-things-
considered ought or to overriding reason to believe p iff is true.  But what they are 
committed to is that (SC) necessarily gives rise to pro tanto normative force or a 
reason to follow it.  I think this view is also implausible.  It would require that we 
take true beliefs to have necessary value.  Since we have already seen how it’s 
doubtful that they always have instrumental value, we would have to think that 
that every true belief is necessarily finally valuable.  Though it’s hard to dissuade 
staunch fans, I argue elsewhere that this position has little to recommend it.  Here 
I’ll say just that the view looks extremely implausible when we consider beliefs 
about propositions concerning the number of grains of sand in a particular square 
acre of Namibian desert. 
 I’ve argued that we shouldn’t think that belief’s standard of correctness is 
normative in the strong sense.  In the next section I want to turn to uncovering 
what an interpretation of the normativity of correctness in the weaker sense might 
look like. 
4 The Standard of Correctness: The Weak Version 
It’s not uncommon for theorists who doubt the possibility of a strong construal of 
(SC)’s normativity to settle on a kind of fallback position: though the standard of 
correctness might not give rise to any necessary principles of active governance, 
it’s a basic fact about belief that it’s a state that’s correct iff it’s true.  But what does 
such a claim amount to?  When we drew the distinction between a strong and 
weak sense of normativity, we followed Schroeder’s characterization of the weak 
sense as consisting in “categorization or classification schemes that divide actions 
or events into distinct types”, or acting as “general principles of description” and 
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Parfit’s characterization of facts whose correct-making features are exhausted by 
what is “allowed or disallowed by some rule or requirement in some practice or 
institution.”  Both gave norms of etiquette and rules of a game as examples that fell 
into the weak sense category.  We might then try to understand belief’s standard of 
correctness by thinking of it as similar to an etiquette norm or a game rule.  On this 
picture we could say that what it is for it to be the case that, in the etiquette 
domain, putting your napkin in your lap is correct, is for it to be endorsed by a 
corresponding norm of etiquette.  Similarly, what it is to be a correct move in Tic-
Tac-Toe is for that move to be permissible by the rules of Tic-Tac-Toe.  So on our 
comparison with the correctness standard for belief, what it is to be correct qua 
belief is to be correct iff true.     
 This comparison has in fact been made in the literature on the norms of 
belief. Côté-Bouchard suggests that perhaps belief norms “have the same kind of 
normative authority as e.g. norms of etiquette, fashion, games, and the like.” He 
thinks that on this picture “there can still be facts about what we should…believe.  
But just like facts about what we should do according to etiquette, they are not 
genuinely normative facts” (2016, 3196).  Hazlett makes a similar suggestion 
(2013).   So on this view, it’s good relative to the believing domain that we believe 
propositions iff they’re true, but that’s not to say that the believing domain issues 
norms that have force in the strong sense.  I propose, then, that we consider more 
carefully whether an apt comparison can be made between belief’s standard of 
correctness and a norm of etiquette or a game norm.   
 Consider two domains: etiquette and Tic-Tac-Toe.  And take a token norm 
from each domain. Let’s use as examples: 
 
domain: etiquette 
token norm: When seated at the dinner table, it’s correct to place one’s 
napkin in one’s lap. 
 
domain: Tic-Tac-Toe 
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token norm: When playing Tic-Tac-Toe it’s correct to try to configure 
the board so that three consecutive squares are yours.26  
 
What’s important to notice when we consider token norms in these domains, is 
that they avail themselves of no further kinds of consideration qua norm of that 
domain.  There are no available further considerations about a “Put your napkin in 
your lap” norm qua norm of etiquette, and there are no available further 
considerations about a “Mark three squares in a row to win” norm qua norm of 
Tic-Tac-Toe.  One way we might put this thought is that our concept of etiquette 
can be fully cashed out in terms of, say, requirements of politeness or propriety.  
And our concept of Tic-Tac-Toe is one that can be fully cashed out in terms of the 
rules that constitute a game win.  This is not to say, of course, that we can’t imagine 
reasons for which we might ignore or flout these norms.  I might have overriding 
reason not to put my napkin in my lap because we’re having a contest to see whose 
napkin can remain the cleanest, and we’ve agreed that our napkins must be on full 
display at all times.  And I might have all-things-considered reason to let you win at 
Tic-Tac-Toe because I fear your petulance when you lose.  But notice that when we 
deploy such considerations, we’ve clearly departed from evaluation from within 
the domain of etiquette or from within the domain of Tic-Tac-Toe.  In other words, 
there’s a sense in which the standard of the norm exhausts the conceptual role.   
 Do the same considerations hold when we compare the standard of 
correctness and the concept of belief?  I think it’s very different in the belief 
domain and the difference gives us good reason to reject the thought that there’s 
any sense to be made of the weak normative interpretation that endorses the mere 
fact that beliefs are correct iff true.  When we think back to the considerations 
about doxastic deliberation with which we began, presumably we’re supposed to 
think that Evidential Exclusivity and Transparency are features of deliberation that 
suggest to us belief’s standard of correctness.  And Shah tells us that it’s the fact 
                                                      
26 Assuming you’ve followed the other rules of play. 
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that belief has a standard of correctness such that a belief is correct iff only if it’s 
true that is supposed to explain EE/T.  But it seems perfectly in keeping with the 
concept of belief to consider beliefs formed and regulated in accordance with 
truth-independent reasons.  And when we think about false beliefs that are the 
results of beneficial doxastic biases, these considerations can seem powerful, 
authoritative, or dominant.  Unlike etiquette or Tic-Tac-Toe, whose conceptual 
domains seem to be exhausted by their sets of norms, we seem to remain clearly 
within the conceptual domain of belief when we consider or evaluate beliefs held 
for truth-independent reasons.  It’s simply that during doxastic deliberation we 
can’t/don’t endorse them.  Because of this, I think it’s neither true to say that it's 
our concept of belief that moves us to settle deliberation about what to believe 
only in accordance with truth-related considerations or that belief has a standard 
of correctness such that a belief is correct iff it’s true.  It’s neither the case that we 
can interpret the correctness in play in that standard as giving rise to certain 
normative recommendations or that it’s simply true in a sort of categorizational 
sense that it falls out of the concept of belief that the correct ones are the true ones.  
 Shah’s and Velleman’s explanation of EE/T hold that it’s the deployment of 
the concept <BELIEF>, or in other words, the awareness that it’s the content of a 
belief that we’re deliberating over, that triggers us to treat only evidential 
considerations as relevant.  But this explanation seems unsatisfactory because it 
can very well seem to be an open question – even during deliberation – about 
whether it might be better if we were to believe in accordance with non-truth-
related considerations.  Shah writes that the “deliberative question whether to 
believe that p inevitably gives way to the factual question whether p”.  But it would 
seem to require no conceptual confusion to pose to oneself the question whether 
to believe that p, and then to go on to consider what the effect on one’s wellbeing 
might be if one were to believe that p.  Rather what’s at stake is the fact that one 
can’t transition directly from non-evidential considerations to belief.  But that fact 
doesn’t need to be explained by positing a norm to which the belief state is 
necessarily subject.   
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 To see that it doesn’t seem to be the concept of belief that’s doing the work, 
notice that many (most?) of the instances in which a deliberator might be 
described as “deliberating about whether to believe p” she could just as well be 
said to be asking herself “whether p” without any reference to belief at all.  Shah 
might take this as a point in favor of his claim that the first question immediately 
reduces to the second.  But we might instead take it as a reason to question 
whether we can derive any conclusions about the normative nature of the concept 
of belief at all.  Consider the difference between two questions: 
 
1. Stella is trying to find out whether Hillary will win.  She first 
consults fivethirtyeight.com, which gives Hillary a 64% chance, and 
then she consults electionbettingodds.com, which gives her an 82% 
chance. She then asks herself “Should I believe that Hillary will 
win?” and begins to conduct an investigation into the reliability of 
the websites.  
 
2. (3 days later) Stella is thinking about the tragedy of life on Earth.  
She thinks the world seems overly cruel and that, contrary to what 
her grandmother thinks, it’s not the case that “everything happens 
for a reason”. She asks herself if maybe she should believe in an 
afterlife, despite her lack of evidence.   
 
The first question I think reduces straightforwardly to the question “Is p true?”.  
The second question doesn’t reduce so neatly.  Stella’s not wondering whether p is 
true, but rather whether or not it would be to her advantage to believe p.  She’s not 
conceptually confused, she is deliberating about whether to believe p,27 and, 
contrary to what Shah says, her deliberative question did not immediately give 
way to the question “whether p is true.” It’s interesting that it’s the second 
                                                      
27 If we build into deliberation that considerations are necessarily truth-relevant, then we’ve begged the 
question. 
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question that seems to be more strongly “framed by the concept of belief” than the 
first, in which we could more easily excise all reference to belief.    
 I’ve tried to put us in a position to think that the (SC) proposal is an 
unsatisfying explanation of EE/T.  Instead of licensing us to derive normative 
conclusions about the state of belief, I’ve suggested that we should think that EE/T 
can be used only to highlight a feature of deliberation (and as suggested in the 
preceding paragraph, maybe only some kinds of deliberation).  In the final section, 
I want to sketch the beginnings of a picture that could serve as an alternative 
explanation of EE/T – one that not only takes into account features of deliberation, 
but also tries to respect other core features of belief’s functional profile.   
5 An Alternate Explanation 
We should hope that an alternate explanation for Evidential Exclusivity and 
Transparency will  
 
a) make sense of those claims in the way they in fact seem to occur for 
us;  
b) make sense of our two observations about deliberation with 
roughly balanced evidence and normative synchronic and diachronic 
divergence; and  
c) (related to b’s second observation), do a better job accounting for 
core features of belief’s functional profile.  
 
Before I start, I want to say something about the apparent dialectical situation as I 
see it and about the kind of alternate suggestion I’m going to make.  To my 
knowledge there aren’t any other explanations for Evidential Exclusivity and 
Transparency that exist in the literature.  Though Transparency, and more 
recently, Evidential Exclusivity, have been topics of frequent discussion and have 
been taken to license a wide variety of conclusions about belief, Shah’s (and later 
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Shah’s and Velleman’s) argument looks to be the only explicit attempt to posit an 
explanation for their existence.  There are, as we’ve seen, many interpretations of 
the breed of normativity that arises from belief’s standard of correctness. But I 
don’t think there are other options up for consideration regarding what could 
explain EE/T other than a standard of correctness.  This naturally limits what we 
consider to be genuine options, and I think it’s played a role in shaping our 
understanding of the normativity of belief. The alternative picture I’m going to 
sketch is a bit of an evolutionary just-so story.  Evolutionary just-so stories can be 
frustrating because they’re often marked by evidential under-determination.  
That’s true of this one as well, but I think it’s substantially more plausible than the 
existing alternative, and, especially given the lack of considered options, should be 
on the table.        
How do we learn about belief’s functional profile? I suggest that the best 
method is to combine examination of our deeply held commitments with an 
exploration of creature construction.  An examination of our deep commitments 
should elucidate for us the target of explanation.  What features of belief are we 
committed to talking about, to reasoning with, to positing in our best explanations 
and predictions of action guidance and behavior? What must the mental state be 
like to satisfy such roles?  And how might a creature be constructed and evolve so 
as to function in accordance with these roles?  
Though we should think that the answers to these questions leave us with a 
bundle of candidate traits, I want to focus on what I think we can take to be the 
core of these traits.  Eric Mandelbaum writes 
 
I take it that, whatever beliefs are, they must have at least the 
following properties: they must be semantically evaluable (have 
conditions of satisfaction), be able to be acquired by perception, 
interact with desires and other motivational states to cause 
behavior…and be able to serve as the premises in inference. (2014, 
82)       
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Whereas we might take Shah’s explanation to be sensitive to the first and third of 
these conditions, I think his proposal neglects belief’s role in motivation.  In 
characterizing belief’s functional role, Glüer and Wikforss take the core 
components to involve, on the input side, a distinctive sort of evidence-sensitivity, 
and on the output side, action guidance - both inferentially, by providing reasons 
for further beliefs and actions, and non-inferentially (2013, 138).  I want to look 
more closely at the difference between inferential and non-inferential guidance, 
and also at what they mean by the “distinctive sort of evidence-sensitivity”. 
 It’s important to remind ourselves that much of belief’s action-guidance 
happens non-inferentially.  As Railton notes, “For the most part, the regulation of 
action by belief ‘takes care of itself’ without need for supervision or intervention” 
(2014, 139).  When we focus on deliberation, we can lose track of this fact.  Though 
it might seem to us a mundane or obvious feature, I think it bears noting because it 
seems as if deliberative and non-deliberative guidance might happen in 
importantly different ways.   
After Tiberius notes that reflective wisdom consists in the capacity to 
alternate between a perspective of rigorous self-awareness and the abandonment 
of this perspective, she cites studies claiming that this kind of self-awareness is 
indeed possible: people’s illusions are more modest when they are in the 
deliberative mindset, contemplating a decision (2008, 126).28 Hazlett supports this 
claim.  He notes that doxastic activity manifests patterns of selective self-
enhancement.  People with serious illnesses compare themselves with those who 
are worse-off for self-enhancement purposes, but occupy a deliberative mind-set 
aimed at acquiring accurate information when seeking out treatment plans.  In 
addition, he cites multiple studies claiming that “unrealistic optimism and illusions 
of control are manifested to a greater degree in situations of implementation and 
                                                      
28 See for example Gollwitzer and Kinney 1989. 
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action than in situations of deliberation and decision-making.”29  Psychologists 
who see positive illusions as a significant mark of good mental health posit an 
“optimal margin of illusion” that aims to track the sweet spot between complete 
accuracy (which correlates highly with depression) and delusional inaccuracy 
(which leads to imprudent behavior) (Hazlett 2013, 56).  For this reason, it seems 
like we should consider as plausible the thought that deliberation, far from 
exposing general features of the belief state, is a special kind of doxastic process 
that enables us to actively consider factors relevant to accuracy.             
 As we put these facts together, a picture of belief’s functional role begins to 
emerge.  On the input side we think sensitivity to evidence is important in 
demarcating beliefs from other mental states. But we noted that it was a special 
kind of sensitivity to evidence.  The output side of belief’s functional role has as an 
important component belief’s disposition to guide action.  As we’ve seen, in order 
to guide actions that result in a creature’s enhanced wellbeing, the doxastic 
representations that are required are ones that often aren’t accuracy-regulated.  
The degree of evidence-sensitivity, then, should be coordinated with the “optimal 
margin of illusion.”   
 Consider, then, a perspective from creature construction.  One model we 
could consider is a creature who seeks to maximize expected utility.  But let’s 
suppose it turns out that that creature’s planning capacities are far from the ideal.  
It’s exceedingly poor at forgoing current pleasures or satisfactions in favor of 
increasing utility down the road – even in cases when the long-term utility far 
outweighs the sacrifice in short-term utility.  In addition, as John Heil notes, it may 
well be “on the whole, ill-equipped to produce dispassionate reckonings of the 
long-range consequences of actions even in settings of only moderate complexity” 
(1992, 54).  So the first creature loses out to a creature that is programmed 
                                                      
29 In one, for example, subjects were put into a “deliberative mindset” in which they were told that their 
task was to find out which of two lights they have more control over, while other subjects were put into 
an “implemental mindset” and told that their task was to turn on a light of their choosing as many times 
as possible. Subjects in the implemental group overestimated the number of lights they could turn on to 
significantly higher degree than the deliberative group.   
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according to a different model.  This second creature operates during deliberation 
in accordance with a simple, easily implementable norm: “Believe the truth.”  
Though it’s not always possible for the creature to follow that norm directly, it can 
seek to operate in accordance with straightforward bridge principles like “Believe 
in accordance with your evidence.”   
     Heil claims that a “finite doxastic system in which non-epistemic elements 
functioned as constant backseat drivers threatens stability” (Ibid., 53).  Not only 
would it threaten stability, I claim, but it would suffer from significant rule erosion.  
If a system has a ready capacity to manually override its operational rules, those 
rules cease to have efficacious force.  This, I think, is significantly related to our 
first observation of Section 2.  It’s interesting to consider why we seem only to be 
able to exert deliberative discretion in cases of roughly balanced evidence.  We 
could imagine things going otherwise – for example, why isn’t it the case that we 
have discretion only in cases in which what we stand to gain prudentially 
surpasses some threshold?  Philosophers often begin their cases for EE/T or 
against doxastic voluntarism by noting our inability to believe that there’s an 
elephant on our desks, even for massive monetary reward.  It’s these cases, though, 
that would result in the most significant system damage – we would have to see 
ourselves as flouting the norms in the most obvious way, thus opening wide the 
door for recurrent overrides.  It’s no surprise, then, that a creature would be 
constructed so as to maintain relative immunity to this kind of damage.   
 We might liken this situation to a distinction familiar in the moral domain.  
We can compare the substantive principles that a system of norms mandates with 
its regulative principles, the principles agents must follow in order to satisfy the 
substantive norms.  Thus, utilitarianism might require agents to cultivate non-
consequentialist motives to best achieve substantive utilitarian aims.   
The alternate explanation, then, suggests that we’re left with a picture on 
which the best way to realize an overall more valuable outcome is a system on 
which we deliberate in accordance with a norm such as (SC), yet have a doxastic 
system that is directed not towards realizing belief’s standard of correctness, but 
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rather towards increasing wellbeing.  In this way, there isn’t a true interpretation 
of belief’s standard of correctness.  Though it seems we may be built to deliberate 
in accordance with such a norm, that itself isn’t an indication that, in any 
meaningful sense, a belief is correct iff it’s true.         
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Chapter 3 - Tradeoffs and Epistemic Value 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the most active contemporary debates in epistemology concerns the nature 
of epistemic norms – what explains their content and how they instruct believers. 
In particular, these debates have recently centered on whether or not epistemic 
norms are teleological/consequentialist or non-teleological/deontological.30  In 
this paper, I want to look in detail at a few views that claim that an otherwise-
appealing teleological understanding of our epistemic norms must be incorrect. 
Though we’re attracted by a picture that justifies our epistemic norms in terms of 
the valuable end states they produce, some of our most central epistemic 
intuitions, these views suggest, conflict with this picture.  My main interest lies in 
examining the repercussions of such a view for our understanding of the 
normativity of the epistemic domain.  Though the debate about teleological vs. 
non-teleological epistemic norms has begun to garner quite a bit of attention, 
we’ve yet to explore the ramifications of this debate for our understanding of the 
nature of epistemic value.  I’m going to argue that a close look at our epistemic 
judgments, and in particular, how these judgments compare to judgments in the 
moral domain, sheds light on the nature of epistemic value, and, ultimately, on how 
we should think about the fundamental contours that shape the epistemic domain. 
Philosophers often introduce views in epistemology by articulating broad 
underlying assumptions about the domain.  A quick search for “epistemic 
                                                      
30 See, for instance, Jenkins 2007; Berker 2013a; Berker 2013b; Greaves 2013; Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn 
2014; Goldman 2015; Wrenn 2016; Friedman 2018. 
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normativity” pulls up multiple papers that open with proclamations on the nature 
of epistemology: “Epistemology, many think, is about what we should or should 
not believe. It is, in other words, about epistemic norms, i.e. the norms that specify 
the…truth-related conditions under which we are required or permitted to believe 
things” (Côté-Bouchard 2016, 3181).  Brian Talbot writes  
 
When most epistemologists consider the question ‘What ought one 
believe?’ or ‘Ought so and so believe such and such?’ they take the 
answers to these questions to be binding, take them as arising from 
reasons and rules which are in turn generated by an epistemic end, 
and take this end as having true belief as a necessary ingredient. 
(2014, 616)   
 
One especially common way to begin discussion of epistemology’s normativity is 
to compare it to a more familiar domain of normativity – the ethical domain.  
Jaegwon Kim begins his “What is Naturalized Epistemology?” by claiming that 
“epistemology is a normative discipline as much as, and in the same sense as, 
normative ethics” (1988, 383). Similar claims that draw out the parallels between 
our talk about epistemic matters and ethical matters can be found in, to name a 
few, Feldman (2000), Alston (1989), Pollock (1987), Rinard (2017), and Schroeder 
(2014).   
 Selim Berker’s 2013 paper “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of 
Propositions” opens with just such a comparison. He begins: “As I see it, the most 
fundamental question in ethics is ‘What should I do?’” (2013a, 337). He notes that 
the question can take on different forms depending on one’s preferred way of 
putting it.  We can ask what one has most reason to do, what’s rational for one to 
do, what one is justified in doing, etc., and we can ask related questions about what 
one ought to do or how one ought to live narrowly – Should I lie to my friend about 
where I was last Saturday? or broadly – What sort of life should one live? Meta-
ethicists ask the fundamental questions: What does the question mean? What 
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would constitute an answer to the question and what methodology should we 
deploy in seeking an answer?  Normative ethics, on the other hand, aims to supply 
answers to our substantive questions about what to do. Berker continues: “I think 
it is useful to view epistemology as having a parallel structure. On this way of 
conceiving of the discipline, the fundamental guiding question in epistemology is 
‘What should I believe’”? (Ibid., 338). Like in ethics, we can ask the question in 
terms of rationality, warrant, justification, or what we have most reason to believe.       
 So far I’ve tried to point out a few basic assumptions that ground 
contemporary epistemology: epistemology is a normative domain, it’s often 
thought to be guided by the normative question about what one ought to believe,31 
and its normativity is analogous to other familiar kinds of normativity like moral 
normativity. Berker’s pair of 2013 papers32 makes all of these assumptions and in 
addition is a good jumping-off point to think about the recent interest in examining 
whether or not the structure of epistemic norms is teleological.  In the next section, 
we’ll take a look at the analogy between the fundamental projects of ethics and 
epistemology and the import this analogy has for understanding epistemic 
normativity.  
1 The Ethics and Epistemology Analogy 
After his initial sketch of the analogous guiding questions of ethics and 
epistemology, Berker writes:  
  
In what follows, I want to use this analogy between normative 
evaluations of actions and normative evaluations of beliefs to tease 
out, and then argue against, a certain strain of thought that seems to 
have become an article of faith in much recent epistemological 
                                                      
31 “What should I believe?” is not taken to be the only question that guides contemporary epistemology.  
Virtue epistemologists, for instance, give more weight to the question “What sort of agent should one 
be?”    
32 Berker 2013a, and 2013b “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.” 
 81 
theorizing. According to this strain of thought, what distinguishes 
epistemic norms from other sorts of norms (prudential, moral, and so 
on,) is that epistemic norms are guided by a distinctive set of goals. 
Most often these epistemic goals are taken to be the twin goals of 
acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Sometimes, though, the 
list of epistemic goals is broadened to include other items, such as the 
acquisition of knowledge, or coherent belief-systems, or 
understanding, or wisdom. But regardless of what the list of epistemic 
goals looks like, the guiding idea behind this strain of thought is that 
all other normative notions in epistemology are ultimately explicable 
in terms of how well the objects of assessment conduce toward, 
promote, or otherwise subserve these epistemic goals. (2013a, 339) 
 
Berker goes on to attempt to convince us that “this consequentialist/teleological 
approach to normative epistemology is positively misguided” (Ibid., 340).33   
Consequentialism, in ethics, is a family of theories united – at least roughly - 
by a certain structural feature: that the evaluative determines the deontic.  In other 
words, the good – however it is identified – determines in some way what ought to 
be done.  A simple version of a consequentialist theory in ethics is hedonistic 
utilitarianism.  Pleasure is good, pain is bad, and nothing else has value or disvalue 
as an end. A (maximizing) hedonistic utilitarian would hold that some action is 
right insofar as it produces on balance the most pleasure and the least amount of 
pain.  Consequentialism, in epistemology, is likewise a family of theories united by 
the same structural idea.  An epistemic consequentialist begins with an evaluative 
                                                      
33 Berker here is using ‘teleological’ and ‘consequentialist’ interchangeably.  Later in the paper I show 
that there is some ambiguity in the deployment of these terms in recent work in epistemology. I point 
to work where ‘teleological’ is used to pick out theories whose norms are grounded in or explained by 
value. This is different from consequentialist theories, which typically assume the rightness of a 
particular response to value – usually maximizing, sometimes satisficing, but always promoting relevant 
value in some way.  On this classification, consequentialism would be a breed of teleology.  But this use 
of teleology doesn’t allow for a sufficient contrast with deontological views, so I will follow Berker in 
focusing on the conducing or promoting aspect of teleology and consequentialism, thus using the terms 
interchangeably.   
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claim, say, that believing important truths is good and believing falsely is bad.34 
The deontic claim follows:  we ought to conduct our epistemic lives so that we 
believe many important truths and refrain from believing falsehoods.35  
What’s important to notice about the structure of teleological theories is 
that in identifying the various goods that have final value and constructing a 
theory of overall value out of the theory of final value there can be conflicts or 
competition amongst final values.  These conflicts can arise due to competition 
between different species of final value, say between keeping a promise and not 
causing harm, or competition between the same species of final value, say between 
keeping one of two mutually exclusive promises.  The epistemological equivalent 
of such tradeoffs might (for an epistemic value pluralist) be a conflict that arises 
between adopting a belief that is highly explanatory versus one that is more 
testable, or a conflict that arises due to the risk of believing falsehoods when one 
sets out to believe significant truths.  
Thus there arises a question about how to determine value overall.  
Teleological theories need a way of “trading off” these values against one another 
in order to determine a final verdict.36  Say that one accepts a tradeoff when one 
sacrifices something of final value for something of greater final value.  Because 
teleological theories in ethics can have conflicts between final values and must 
settle on an overall value verdict, they countenance tradeoffs between these values 
in determining what action should be done. Berker thinks that if the right 
                                                      
34 Though epistemologists nearly uniformly take epistemic good to involve true belief, some are 
interested in knowledge, understanding, etc.  So long as the picture involves a specification of the good 
and a promotional relationship towards the good, the formulation of the epistemic good won’t matter 
for the purposes of this paper.   
35 In what follows, I will point out some important differences between the behavior of consequentialist 
norms in ethics and epistemology.  There are other differences in consequentialist ethics and 
epistemology theories also worth noting that I will not discuss – for example, it’s common for ethical 
consequentialists to hold that agents should be impartially concerned with producing goodness for all 
affected beings.  Epistemic consequentialists, on the other hand, focus on the personal value of believing 
(significant) truths.  So unlike the ethical consequentialist, epistemic consequentialists apparently do not 
conceive of epistemic goals as concerning the impartial production of epistemic value.   
36 The most common way of determining overall value, familiar in consequentialist theories, is 
aggregation – the value of available options are summed and then compared.   
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approach to epistemology were teleological, then we should also expect the correct 
theory of what to believe to countenance tradeoffs between epistemic goods. But, 
he claims, no epistemologists – even ones who explicitly embrace teleological 
frameworks, are willing to countenance such tradeoffs in the epistemic domain, so 
the teleological approach to epistemic normativity must be incorrect.    
 Ethical consequentialists often face the accusation that their theories 
countenance morally problematic tradeoffs.  Consider familiar examples in which 
an unruly mob could be pacified by the scapegoating of an innocent, or a patient at 
the hospital for a well checkup could be used to save the lives of a handful of 
people in need of organ donations.  At least on the face of it, these seem like cases 
in which the value to be gained by sacrificing the interests of the one for the many 
would be greater if we were to act in a way that appears to many of us intuitively 
morally problematic.  Thus non-consequentialists argue that it’s not always true 
that the evaluative determines the deontic.  Berker refers to this countenancing of 
tradeoffs as one of teleology’s greatest vices.  He notes that Rawls identifies the 
problematic feature in the above examples as a failure to respect the “separateness 
of persons” (1999, 16). The problem, as he sees it, is that the wellbeing of the many 
is aggregated.  The people whose wellbeing is lumped together fail to be treated as 
individual persons with individual perspectives.  We frequently think that it’s 
impermissible to sum the many small burdens that a large group of people might 
experience in order to outweigh a giant burden that we could impose on a single 
person. If the many people were one person, the larger burden could legislate in 
favor of imposing the smaller burden.37  But in situations similar to the one above, 
there is no single person who would carry the weight of the entire burden, and so 
burdening one for the benefit of the many seems impermissible.  
 Similar tradeoffs, Berker notes, can occur in epistemology.  Take Jane, who 
has no evidence that God exists.  But if she forms the belief that God exists despite 
                                                      
37 Interesting to note, however, is that Rawls in fact endorses a few different kinds of tradeoffs with 
respect to wellbeing.  His Second Principle of Justice aggregates wellbeing over social classes and endorses 
a tradeoff between limits on gains in wellbeing for the well-off for the sake of benefits to the less well-
off.  And his General Conception of justice permits tradeoffs between well-being and rights.    
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her lack of evidence, she’ll be more likely to receive a large grant from a religiously 
affiliated funding agency.  The grant will ensure that she goes on to believe many 
more interesting true propositions than she would believe otherwise (Fumerton 
1995, 12). Or take John, a mathematician suffering from an illness that doctors say 
would ordinarily kill him in two months’ time. He’s on the cusp of proving the 
Continuum Hypothesis, but he needs six more months. If John stubbornly clings to 
his belief that he will recover, it will in fact significantly raise his chances of 
surviving long enough to complete his proof and derive many other interesting 
truths about set theory (Berker 2013b, 369)38. 
 If one were to hold a simple epistemic consequentialist view, say, on which 
interesting true beliefs were valuable and false beliefs were disvaluable, it would 
seem – even putting aside possible prudential benefits to exclusively consider the 
epistemic benefits - that Jane should believe that God exists, and John should 
believe that he will recover.  After all, Jane and John would go on to believe more 
interesting true things and thus be in states that have much more epistemic value.  
But the problem is that even if we stipulate that believing that God exists or 
believing that you’d recover would allow you to accrue more of what we consider 
epistemically valuable, we don’t thereby judge that those beliefs are justified, 
warranted, rational, or the likes.  Even if a particular false belief opened the door to 
many other important truths, it doesn’t seem to make that view any more 
reasonable.  Epistemologists widely agree: Klausen claims that “on reflection,” 
thinking of epistemic norms as consequentialist in this way, is “preposterous” 
(2009, 165). After all, how could anything having to do with the epistemic standing 
of other beliefs have any bearing on the epistemic standing of a particular belief – 
save by their being epistemically or logically connected, which by hypothesis, is 
not the case? Feldman writes that in considering whether to believe, disbelieve or 
suspend judgment on proposition p, one is to consider only these options and only 
the end of getting at the truth about p  
                                                      
38 Berker’s choice of the Continuum Hypothesis for this example is not ideal, since its status is known for 
familiar set theories.  Sub in your preferred not-yet-proven hypothesis, such as the Riemann Hypothesis. 
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….and irrelevant to this judgment are the long-term consequences of 
adopting the belief. It is the truth about p now that matters. Thus, if 
believing something now would somehow lead me to believe lots of 
truths later, that long-term epistemic benefit is also irrelevant to it. 
(1988, 249) 
 
Berker thinks that given the veritistic teleologist’s twin goals of believing true 
propositions and not believing false propositions, that we should expect tradeoffs 
to occur ordinarily between these fundamental aims.  But what he thinks has not 
been sufficiently appreciated is that veritistic theories must allow for tradeoffs 
with respect to different propositions: the theories must balance the value of 
believing one proposition if it is true/disvalue of believing it if it is false with the 
value and disvalue associated with all other propositions.  “But such tradeoffs”, 
Berker writes, “are beyond the pale” (2013a, 363). He continues: 
 
When determining the epistemic status of a belief in a given 
proposition, it is epistemically irrelevant whether or not that belief 
conduces (either directly or indirectly) toward the promotion of true 
belief and the avoidance of false belief in other propositions beyond 
the one in question…When it comes to the evaluation of individual 
beliefs, it is never epistemically defensible to sacrifice the furtherance 
of our epistemic aims with regard to one proposition in order to 
benefit our epistemic aims with regard to other propositions… (Ibid., 
365) 
 
Just as the ethical consequentialist ignores the separateness of persons if her 
theory endorses chopping up one to save five or throwing one in jail to pacify an 
unruly mob, Berker thinks the epistemic consequentialist goes wrong when she 
ignores the epistemic separateness of propositions.  Berker is not the first to note 
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the requirement to consider the justificatory status of propositions separately.  In 
an influential formulation of epistemic normativity, Chisholm writes “…every 
person is subject to a purely intellectual requirement – that of trying his best to 
bring about that for every proposition h he considers, he accepts h if and only if it 
is true” (1977, 14).  Berker locates the teleologist’s problem in her failure to 
respect the epistemic separateness of propositions in his 2013a.  In “The Rejection 
of Epistemic Consequentialism,” though he continues to find ignoring the 
separateness of propositions problematic, he expands his view to encompass the 
more general issue of teleology’s conducing or promoting relation.  In what follows, 
I will talk more about how conducing or promotion relates to teleology and to 
epistemic evaluation more generally. But first I will look further into the 
comparison between tradeoffs in the ethical and epistemic domains.      
Is Berker right that ethical non-consequentialism has something to teach us 
about epistemology?  I think he is, but what I think it can help elucidate is not the 
same as what he thinks it shows us. Curiously, he concludes that epistemic norms 
must be non-teleological, but in none of his three papers39 on the topic does he 
offer a satisfying explanation of the objectionable feature of teleology. What makes 
countenancing tradeoffs bad in the epistemic domain? Why is conducing or 
promoting value the wrong way to think about epistemic normativity?  In fact, I 
think the specific conclusion Berker draws – that an analogy with ethics can show 
us that epistemic norms are non-teleological – is not very helpful.  I think this for 
two main reasons.  The first is that the analogy between separateness of persons 
and separateness of propositions elides important differences in the permissibility 
of tradeoffs in the ethical and epistemic domains. I will argue that ignoring these 
differences masks a further important difference in how we should understand the 
value and the thus the normativity in play in the respective domains.  The second is 
that the purported target of Berker’s project is epistemic normativity – all of it – 
and by identifying the question that underlies the epistemic domain as the 
                                                      
39 See also Berker’s “Reply to Goldman: Cutting up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology” (2015). 
 87 
question “What should I believe?” he casts its purview maximally widely.  But I 
think that the epistemic intuitions Berker uncovers don’t in fact spell out answers 
for what characterizes epistemic normativity, especially if that normativity is taken 
to be the normativity of belief - as he suggests when he casts epistemology’s target 
question as “What should I believe?”.  I think his results actually characterize a 
narrow subsection of what can plausibly be taken to count as the normative 
domain of the epistemic -- a domain which is itself only a cross-section of what we 
might think of as the normative domain of the entire state of belief.  In this section 
I’ll draw attention to a couple of important differences in how tradeoffs are treated 
in ethics and epistemology, and in the sections that follow, I’ll use this observation 
alongside Berker’s conclusion to draw out some import for our wider 
understanding of epistemic normativity.  
2 Tradeoffs: Interpersonal and Inter-Propositional  
Berker is aware that countenancing tradeoffs is not always a vice in ethics.  After 
all, not all interpersonal tradeoffs ignite the separateness of persons objection.  
However he thinks it’s the possibility of cross-propositional value tradeoffs that 
spells doom for the epistemic consequentialist.  How, then, do interpersonal and 
inter-propositional tradeoffs relate?  There are different tradeoff structures that 
could make this point equally well, so I’m simply going to select two.  We’ll look 
first at a kind of tradeoff that does not run afoul of the separateness of persons 
charge.  Think of a very ordinary kind of tradeoff in which some person takes on 
some small disvalue in order to help another person.  Call this an ordinary cross-
person tradeoff: 
 
OCP tradeoff: A incurs some small harm in order to promote a greater 
benefit (/prevent a greater harm) to B. 
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OCP tradeoffs are routine.  You and I are participating in an amateur cycling race, 
cycling together on a secluded portion of the racecourse. If you crash and I’m the 
only one around, I’m presumably obligated to stop and help you.  The benefit of 
your receiving appropriate medical help outweighs the disvalue I incur by losing 
time in the race.  Ethical consequentialists and deontologists agree that OCPs are 
often permissible or required.  There are many ways OCP tradeoffs can come about 
and can include (infinitely) many configurations in terms of number of people and 
benefit/harm allocation.  By stipulation, OCP tradeoffs don’t raise the separateness 
of person worry because the relevant sort of cross-person aggregation of 
consequences isn’t taking place – the  assessment of the total harm or benefit 
doesn’t involve the questionable lumping of multiple peoples’ individual 
perspectives into one. 
 More interesting to think about, perhaps, is a different kind of cross-
personal tradeoff – one that more closely mirrors the structure of the tradeoffs 
Berker describes.  Think of a far less ordinary kind of tradeoff in which some 
person incurs great (maybe maximal) disvalue in order to benefit a great number 
of people.  Call this kind of case a threshold tradeoff: 
  
Threshold tradeoff: great disvalue to A, very large benefit (/prevention 
of a very great harm) to a very large group of people  
 
Suppose terrorists have hijacked a large plane and we have extremely strong 
reason to think that they will blow it up, killing 380 people, unless we kill one 
person.  Interestingly, in such a case most deontologists agree that we ought to kill 
one person to save the 380 people.  Nagel writes “[D]eliberately killing an innocent 
is impermissible unless it is the only way to prevent some very large evil (say the 
deaths of fifty innocent people). Call this the threshold at which the prohibition 
against murder is overridden” (2012, 62).   
Make a distinction between absolute deontology and moderate deontology.  
Whereas absolute deontologists find the violation of deontological constraints 
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always and everywhere impermissible, thus allowing for the occurrence of morally 
catastrophic events that could be prevented by a single instance of such a violation, 
moderate deontologists permit violations of constraints or require promotions of 
the greater good under extreme circumstances.  Though deontology is often 
characterized by its contrast with consequentialism and that contrast is clearest in 
its absolutist form, it’s exceedingly difficult to find examples of philosophers who 
actually hold such a view.  The best example seems to be common renderings of 
Kant, who famously claimed “Better the whole world should perish,” than that 
injustice be done (Ladd 1965, 100). As Alexander and Moore point out, some 
deontologists’ treatments of threshold cases seem to simply evade the question – 
Anscombe says that true moral agents can’t even think of such real or imagined 
cases because the mere thinking of them is immoral, and Williams thinks that such 
cases are “beyond morality” and beyond reason.40  Notice, though, that an 
absolutist view like Kant’s in which some deontological constraint can’t be violated 
or greater good promoted even in order to prevent thousands of occurrences of 
the very act the constraint prohibits is often taken to devolve into a reductio.  And 
failures to treat head-on threshold cases, like Anscombe’s and Williams’, seem to 
share the weakness of viewing our moral reasoning as ill-equipped to deal with 
sufficiently difficult cases – even theoretically – and to resign ourselves to the 
belief that our moral reasons simply run out.   
Moderate deontology, on the other hand, is a quite well-represented view.  
Thresholds beyond which deontological constraints may or should be violated or 
greater good ought to be promoted are positively represented or endorsed in – to 
name a few – Kagan, Nagel, Ross, Moore, Alexander, Scheffler and Kamm.41  
Michael Moore (2010) likens the moderate deontologist’s use of thresholds to a 
dam.  Water rises behind a dam until it reaches the threshold height of the dam, 
after which the water spills over.  Moderate deontology’s thresholds mark the 
                                                      
40 Anscombe 1958, Williams 1973, and Alexander and Moore 2016. 
41 Ross 1930; Scheffler 1982; Kagan 1998; Alexander 2000; Kamm 2007; Moore 2010; Nagel 2012.  
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point at which constraints can be violated because of the spillover of negative 
consequences.  
By this point the differences in ethical deontology’s treatment of tradeoffs 
and epistemology’s purported treatment of tradeoffs should begin to become 
apparent.  Remember that Berker likened failure to respect the epistemic 
separateness of propositions to failure to respect the ethical separateness of 
persons.  Besides more obvious features which lessen the aptness of the 
ethics/epistemology tradeoff analogy - such as the fact that unlike in the epistemic 
case of propositions, in ethics the separateness of persons worry arises from the 
normative status of persons who we often take to make reasonable claims on us - 
there are two important things to notice as we consider the fruitfulness of this 
analogy.  As we saw in the case of OCP tradeoffs, there are cross-personal tradeoffs 
that ethicists of all stripes endorse that don’t raise the separateness of persons 
worry.  And for cases that do raise the separateness of persons worry, like the 
threshold cases, the number of ethicists that fail to endorse the tradeoff appears to 
be vanishingly small.  But the striking thing about the epistemic domain is that it 
appears as if it licenses no tradeoffs whatsoever.  Not only do our epistemic 
intuitions seem to mark epistemically unjustified the adoption of a particular belief 
for which we have insufficient evidence in order to secure great future epistemic 
gains, but they (perhaps to an even greater extent) legislate against the epistemic 
version of the everyday OCP tradeoffs – say, the adoption of one evidentially 
unjustified belief in order to believe another more important true proposition.  As 
Berker writes  
 
[…] if the consequentialist/teleological approach to normative 
epistemology were the correct one, we’d expect that the correct 
theory of what we should believe would also countenance trade-offs 
between goods – in this case, trade-offs between epistemic goods. 
However no one – not even those epistemologists who most willingly 
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embrace the consequentialist/teleological framework – is willing to 
countenance all such tradeoffs in the epistemic case. (2013a, 340) 
 
So, Berker characterizes epistemic consequentialism as falling prey to a problem 
analogous to one that plagues ethical consequentialism.  Yet the kind of non-
teleological theory that would correctly capture the received fundamental 
epistemic norm of believing the truth about a particular proposition is so 
extreme/absolute that it’s doubtful whether any contemporary deontologist 
actually endorses such a view.  I think it’s worth considering why this is true.   
3 Teleology and its Relation to Value  
Though my ultimate goal for this section is to argue that the extreme deontological 
picture that Berker supports in epistemology yields some interesting conclusions 
about epistemic value, I want to first try to gain a clearer understanding of 
teleology’s background relation to value in a given evaluative domain.   
In justifying the thresholds at which deontological constraints should be 
infringed, moderate deontologists typically appeal to the massive amount of value 
at stake.  Describing moderate deontology, Heuer writes: “…consequences of a 
certain kind—catastrophic ones—must be avoided even at the price of violating 
restrictions, or the restriction can be defeated by consequences whose disvalue is 
out of proportion with the particular value that the restrictions protect” (2011, 
236). This can seem to some like a feature that threatens the deontological nature 
of the theory. However we shouldn’t think that deontologists don’t acknowledge 
the value of consequences that can be promoted, but rather that they recognize 
more features of situations that are normatively valuable than only the value of the 
consequences.  Moderate deontologists typically recognize a constraint against 
doing harm, but in extreme cases in which enormous amounts of harm can be 
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prevented or value promoted by doing harm, they believe that the value at stake 
must be respected (Kagan 1997).42   
I think this point is actually related to a confusion epistemologists have in 
terms of how to think about teleological views.  I noted in an earlier footnote that I 
would make a clarification about how I was deploying the term.  Berker uses the 
terms ‘teleological’ and ‘consequentialist’ interchangeably and means to focus on 
the promoting or conducing aspect of the theories. But it’s common for 
epistemologists writing on this issue to make other kinds of unhelpful 
terminological choices or characterizations.  One such example is Friedman’s 
“Teleological Epistemology”.  She begins by noting that it’s typically thought that 
epistemic states like knowing, understanding, truly believing, etc. are valuable.  
They’re states that are good to be in and we often aim or want to be in them.  That 
these states are thought to be good or valuable is what in turn grounds and 
explains our epistemic norms.  Like Berker, Friedman is arguing that this value-
based picture, which she calls a teleological conception of epistemic normativity, 
cannot be correct.  She writes “Let’s call norms that are grounded in or explained 
by values – either valuable states or states of affairs or the things that actual 
epistemic subjects value – teleological.”  She sees the teleologist as making two 
main claims:  
 
 (1) A value claim: knowledge [or true belief, etc.] is valuable/valued.  
(2) A grounding claim: that knowledge is valuable/valued grounds or 
explains our central epistemic norms; these norms are teleologically 
grounded (2018, 3). 
                                                      
42 This feature has caused some consequentialists to argue that moderate deontology is actually just a 
form of consequentialism. I imagine an absolute deontologist might argue the same thing.  Though I 
think moderate deontology is in fact perfectly coherent - defining consequentialism as a theory that 
articulates what we should do in terms of what promotes desired (satisficing, maximizing, etc.) 
consequences, and deontology in terms of invoking constraints on that promotional relation, is, I think, 
a good way to go - the terminological dispute doesn’t concern me here. My aim is merely to draw 
attention to the fact that deontological views of the kind analogous to what Berker diagnoses in 
epistemology hardly exist.     
 93 
 
And later: “My thought is that if a norm is teleologically grounded, then that 
explanation will go by way of some valuable or valued state of affairs” (Ibid., 4). Of 
course “go by way of” leaves room for a number of ways this grounding could 
work.  But to my mind, this characterization of teleological views is far too general 
- it doesn’t actually suffice either to distinguish teleological views from non-
teleological/deontological views or to lend focus to the features that she and 
Berker actually find problematic.  My main complaint is that one can endorse a 
view that seems robustly value-based – one in which valuable states are identified 
and thought to explain the norms of that domain, thus satisfying her two 
descriptors of teleology, yet behaves just like familiar non-teleological views, i.e. by 
in particular cases issuing recommendations that recognize constraints on the 
promotion of the good.  We might even think of the most stereotypically 
deontological view, Kantian ethics (at least as articulated in the beginning of the 
Groundwork), as beginning with the idea that only the good will has final value and 
proceeding to treat all norms as born from and explained by that fundamental 
value.  
 It seems that there are ways to respond to fundamental value that do not 
involve maximization or any other kind of direct promotion, but Friedman appears 
to disagree with this thought.  She writes that once we see subjects as valuing 
some end or other or as in pursuit of some valuable end, 
 
there is pressure to think of the relevant subjects as having to 
maximize or optimize with respect to that end.  A subject who is trying 
to acquire knowledge ought to get as much of it as they can going 
forward; anything less seems irrational. If one is trying to acquire 
money, and one is faced with a choice between acquiring one dollar, 
ten dollars, and one hundred dollars, one opts for the latter on pain of 
irrationality…This is to say that there is pressure to say that there is a 
norm in [teleology] that demands we maximize or optimize with 
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respect to our knowledge acquisition. This sort of norm will say that 
subjects should always come to know as much as they can. (2018, 9) 
 
Friedman writes in a footnote on this passage “I hope that it’s clear why the 
teleologist is pushed towards demanding the relevant kind of value maximization. 
In general once we think of subjects as in pursuit of something of value or that they 
value then it’s natural to think that they should get as much of it as they can (other 
things equal).”  And in one more passage, “If we think that epistemic subjects are 
or ought to be trying to know more, then plausibly they will be expected to act so 
as to maximize with every judgment” (Ibid. 12).  Friedman doesn’t say anything 
about what “other things equal” means, but it seems to me like other things would 
very rarely or never be equal.  First off, the epistemic domain is but one evaluative 
domain. So long as we recognize the existence of other evaluative domains, 
(morality, prudence, aesthetics, etc.,) we will acknowledge that the values in these 
domains can conflict with each other. My desire to acquire more knowledge can be 
trumped by my need to run to catch a bus.  Our own cognitive architecture can also 
impose some limits on what shape these norms take – given storage and access 
constraints, it simply isn’t the case that more knowledge is always better.  Given 
these limits, even if we understood the fundamental value of the epistemic domain 
to (more plausibly) consist in interesting or important true belief or knowledge, it 
just isn’t the case that we would be cognitively best served by maximization with 
respect to that goal.   
 The relationship between the fundamental values of an evaluative domain 
and the relations that subjects bear to those values is an interesting one.  As 
Friedman, Berker, and many other epistemologists point out, veritism – the 
thought that the value of true belief (understood in some way) is fundamental to 
the epistemic domain – is nearly ubiquitous.  But just because some value is 
fundamental to an evaluative domain and explains the value of all other values of 
that domain, does not itself dictate that one must bear an instrumentalist or 
promoting attitude toward that value.  Sylvan makes this point nicely in his 2018 
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paper, “Veritism Unswamped”.  He starts with the thought that “in any evaluative 
domain, some values will be more fundamental than others, in the sense that the 
value of everything else in that domain is explained by their value” (382). He 
acknowledges that there are many  values in the epistemic domain – rationality, 
knowledge, coherence, accuracy, justification – but that not all of them can be 
taken to be equally fundamental.  “We admire some of them from the epistemic 
point of view because we admire others from the epistemic point of view” (Ibid.).  
Like other veritists, he thinks that all epistemic values are explained by the fact 
that we value accurate belief.  But he goes on to claim that both opponents and 
proponents of this view understand it in an unreasonably narrow way and are 
widely mistaken about what follows from it. 
 Epistemologists typically assume what Sylvan calls “instrumentalism about 
derivative value”.  This is the thought that there is only one kind of way in which 
we can explain one epistemic value in terms of a more fundamental epistemic 
value.  They assume that the explanation must “proceed by invoking instrumental 
relations, so that for any X, X is derivatively epistemically good only by i) tending to 
produce fundamental epistemic goods, or ii) being the product of something with 
feature i)” (2018, 382).  On this view, all derivative epistemic value is either i) 
production value, or ii) mere product value.  Teleologists, and Friedman in 
addition, think that the proper way to respond to value in the epistemic domain is 
to accept what Sylvan calls the “teleological answer”: “For any fundamental value 
V, the only basically proper way to value V is to instrumentally promote V” (Ibid., 
394).  But this view seems incorrect.  After all, as Nozick (1984) points out, there 
are lots of ways to value things – we can respect them, as we respect the good will 
in Kantian ethics, we can be loyal or dedicated to them, love them, etc..  The 
teleologist seems to believe there’s only one fitting response to fundamental value: 
to promote it.  As Sylvan notes, if we were to take that view towards the value of, 
say, friendship, we would end up spending all of our time trying to make new 
friends and produce more instances of friendship, by say, procuring friends for 
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other people, than showing the proper regard for the friends we already have.  
Dedication to our friends is a prime way to express the value of friendship. 
 In beginning this foray into the question about what makes a view 
teleological, I said that I thought that Friedman’s characterization of teleology 
“didn’t suffice to distinguish teleological views from non-
teleological/deontological views or to lend focus to the features that she and 
Berker actually find problematic.”  Now we’re in a position to see why.  Both 
teleological and non-teleological views can be normatively structured around 
fundamental values.  Though non-teleological views recognize other norms beyond 
the consequentialist’s value promotional norms, they too almost always include 
norms that sometimes require the promoting of fundamental value, such as when 
value thresholds have been surpassed.  So rather than attempt to distinguish 
teleological from non-teleological theories by way of a value and a grounding 
claim, I think it’s better to focus on the particular conducing relationship that 
subjects bear to value in the domain.   
For the purposes of this paper, then, it will be best to understand teleology 
in the same sense as consequentialism - as the view that not only is value 
fundamental, but that the proper response to value is to bring it about – for the 
teleologist all value is “to be promoted” and all disvalue is “to be prevented.”43  
Thus on this view teleology includes what Sylvan calls the narrow 
“instrumentalism about derivative value assumption”, whereas a non-teleological 
veritist might believe that there are other ways to respect fundamental epistemic 
value other than to promote it.   
                                                      
43 Berker 2013a, 343, citing Pettit 1997.  Also see Korsgaard 1993, and Scanlon 1998.  Note that this 
understanding of teleology is different from another conception of teleology which focuses on telos, or 
proper ends or functions.  In this sense, teleological views include views like Aristotle’s that looks to the 
proper ends of humans but does not embrace impartial maximization.  Though ultimately it seems like it 
would be best to have a distinction in place between value-grounded views in general and views that 
entail aggregative responses, for continuity I’m opting for Berker’s synonymous usage of “teleological” 
and “consequentialist” while pointing out the drawbacks of failing to recognize the distinction. 
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4 Epistemic Value and its Relation to Normativity  
We’re now in a position to try to draw out some implications of Berker’s argument 
for our understanding of the nature of epistemic value.  Berker thinks that 
teleological theories countenance tradeoffs.  Since epistemic norms appear not to 
countenance tradeoffs, the correct view of epistemic normativity cannot be 
teleological.  What I want to suggest is that the fact that epistemic normativity does 
not countenance tradeoffs should have direct implications for our conception of 
epistemic value.  My thought is that there is a general relationship between 
countenancing tradeoffs and value.  It’s a simple one: tradeoffs are licensed in light 
of reasonable responses to value.  The idea in broad form is that there is a range of 
reasonable responses to value in a normative domain.  We might think (in keeping 
with moderate deontology) that norms can be directed toward the promotion of 
value in some cases (and respect constraints on value promotion in other cases) 
or, in keeping with maximizing consequentialism, that they can be directed toward 
the promotion of value in all cases, but we can’t take them to be directed toward 
the promotion of value in no cases.  For if that were the case, I claim, we would be 
mistaken to think of what explains the norms as value to begin with.  And that’s 
what I think is in fact happening in a normative domain in which final values can 
conflict, yet which countenances no tradeoffs.   
What we’ve seen so far is that almost every plausible non-teleological 
ethical theory countenances some kinds of cross-personal tradeoffs.  Epistemic 
norms, on the other hand, appear to countenance no tradeoffs whatsoever.  As we 
saw earlier, when non-teleological views in ethics recommend tradeoffs, it’s 
generally because they are taken to be the proper response to great value 
promotion or harm prevention.  But when we learn that there are no tradeoffs that 
are deemed acceptable in determining whether one ought to believe some 
proposition for which one has insufficient evidence, we learn that there’s no 
possible amount of epistemic value the promotion of which would make it that we 
ought to believe p.  We have the same absolute obligation towards each and every 
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proposition, no matter how insignificant it is or how much value is at stake.  If in 
every instance in which it would be possible to secure a great amount of value in 
some domain through a single norm infringement, the norms of that domain 
instruct us to proceed so as not to secure that value, I claim we have reason to 
conclude that the relevant value isn’t behaving like value at all – most likely we 
were wrong to think that that domain was normatively governed by value to begin 
with.  After all, if one conceives of something as valuable, it seems that what makes 
it a value is that it is desired or desirable.  But what we see in the epistemic domain 
is that no amount of value of the thing that’s supposed to ground the value could 
dictate that we should secure that value.  
How are we left to think about the normativity of the epistemic domain?  As 
is common in ethics and value theory, I take there to be a necessary connection 
between normativity and value.44  At first glance, we might think this view 
prejudices us toward the family of teleological or consequentialist views.  But as I 
tried to show earlier, we should take those views to assume a particular 
instrumentalist promotional conception of an agent’s permissible response to 
value.  On my view, the normativity of deontological/non-teleological and 
teleological norms alike comes about in relation to the value that undergirds the 
domain.  In the ethical domain we might take this to be the value (broadly 
construed) of pleasure, or a more nuanced notion of wellbeing, or the good will.  In 
the epistemic domain, the veritist tells us to conceive of true belief as the 
fundamental epistemic value that is supposed to give rise to and explain the 
content of our epistemic norms.  
But now consider the extreme deontological conception of epistemic 
normativity that Berker claims fits our pre-theoretic intuitions.  The structure of 
Berker’s argument is that epistemic norms don’t countenance tradeoffs.  
Teleological theories countenance tradeoffs, so epistemic normativity is non-
teleological.  My response is as follows: Value is such that we might reasonably 
                                                      
44 See for discussion Zimmerman 2015. 
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respond to it by promoting it some of the time or all of the time, but not none of the 
time.  If a theory claims that the norms of a given domain, in which there are 
possible conflicts between final values, do not countenance any tradeoffs – in other 
words, in “trading off” final values against one another in order to determine 
overall value, the norms are structured so that it is impermissible to violate a 
particular norm in any circumstance, no matter the value that could be gained, 
then we should infer from that that value is not in fact what gives rise to the norms 
of that domain.  Since there’s a necessary connection between normativity and 
value, this doesn’t bode well for the normativity of epistemic norms.  In what 
manner should we understand this necessary connection? 
Since we’re exploring the contents of epistemic norms, we might have taken 
it as a given that epistemic norms are normative – in other words that they give 
rise to reasons or oughts that govern what we should do or how we should be.  But 
we must make a distinction between “genuine” or necessary normativity and mere 
norm-relativity.  Broome appeals to this distinction: 
 
[I]n one sense ‘normative’ simply means to do with norms, rules, or 
correctness. Any source of requirements is normative in this sense. 
For example, Catholicism is. Catholicism requires you to abstain from 
meat on Fridays. It is a rule and it is incorrect according to Catholicism 
to eat meat on Fridays. So Catholicism is normative in this sense. But 
I do not use ‘normative’ in that sense. In my sense, it means to do with 
ought or reasons. Given a rule or a requirement we can ask whether 
you ought to follow it, or whether you have reason to do so. (2007 
162)   
 
As Côté-Bouchard puts it,  
 
If a norm N forbids -ing under conditions C, then trivially, -ing 
under C is forbidden, incorrect, wrong, or bad relative to the standard 
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set by N.  However, the descriptive norm-relative question of what is 
permitted or required according to N is distinct from the normative 
question of what there is good or genuinely normative reasons to do. 
(2016, 3182) 
 
Earlier I wrote that there is a necessary connection between normativity and 
value.  We can think of normativity as encompassing two families of concepts: 
evaluative concepts like ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and deontic concepts like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, 
‘permissible’/ ‘impermissible’, etc.  There are two main positions available in the 
literature that articulate how these concepts relate to each other in giving rise to 
the oughts that govern what we should do and how we should be.  We could think 
that value facts explain reason facts: one might hold that the epistemic value of 
true belief is what explains the fact that I have epistemic reason to believe that p.45  
Second, we could think that the reasons we have explain facts about value: one 
might think that the fact that it’s good for me to believe p when I have decisive 
evidence that p is explained by the fact that in that situation, I have reason to 
believe that p.46  In some sense, I think that the difference between these two views 
is a terminological dispute: we could aptly characterize normative structure by 
treating reasons as fundamental building blocks out of which we explain value or 
vice versa. That said, I think the picture on which we take value to explain reasons 
fares better in the literature, is naturally more intuitive, and enjoys a number of 
distinctive theoretical benefits over the opposite view.47  So though I will proceed 
by adopting this underlying picture, all that’s required to secure my conclusion 
that a view of epistemic normativity that countenances no tradeoffs does not give 
                                                      
45 See for example Frankena 1968; Stich 1990; Moore 1903 (Baldwin 1993); Reisner 2009; Steglich-
Petersen 2011. 
46 See Scanlon 1998, 78-107. 
47 See for example Andrew Reisner’s 2009, especially his take on the “inaccuracy objection” – the 
thought that we lose a lot in the reduction from value to reasons since our value concepts are much 
finer-grained than our relatively limited set of pro-attitudes – and his thought that the most promising 
solutions to the Wrong Kinds of Reasons problem get their currency from appeals to independent and 
more fundamental intuitions about value.   
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rise to necessary normativity is a necessary connection between either reasons or 
value and normativity – no matter which family of concepts takes explanatory 
priority.    
On the picture we’ll henceforth adopt, reasons come about in accordance 
with value.  It’s the value of -ing that gives rise to our reason to .48  In cases in 
which there is no value (to promote, to respect, to honor, etc.,) in -ing, we have no 
reason to .  In “Evidential Exclusivity, Correctness, and the Nature of Belief” I 
endorse this same structure and make use of the distinction between “rule-
implying norms” and “reason-implying norms”.  It’s a distinction familiar in value 
theory between norms that act as general descriptive principles or serve to 
categorize or classify actions into distinct types, and norms that act as 
prescriptions or governance principles and give us aims to follow.  Parfit calls the 
first type, which are generally individuated by a rule or practice and don’t give rise 
to necessary reasons to follow them, “rule-implying”.  An example might be the 
collection of permissible moves in chess.  The second kind, which do necessarily 
give us some reason to follow them, he calls “reason-implying” (2011, 309).  An 
example of a reason-implying norm might be a moral norm, like “one should keep 
one’s promises.”   
 When we consider the picture of non-tradeoff-countenancing, absolutist 
non-teleology that Berker thinks characterizes the epistemic domain, we see a 
picture on which there’s a rule to believe the truth for every proposition we 
consider – regardless of whether it’s an utterly insignificant proposition that has 
no value for us and which could be sacrificed for a great number of truths that have 
great significance for us.  Now we might suggest that just because a norm doesn’t 
countenance tradeoffs doesn’t mean it’s not value-based.  Might it not be the case 
that it’s the global value of believing the truth for every proposition that explains 
the value of the norm and thus gives rise to its normative force?  What I’ve 
suggested so far is that a norm that doesn’t recommend value promotion even in 
                                                      
48 See Maguire 2016 for a comprehensive overview of the value-based theory of reasons.  He treats this 
conception as an analysis of what it is to be a reason.     
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instances in which the greatest amounts (infinite!) of value of that domain are at 
stake isn’t behaving like norms grounded in value ordinarily behave and thus 
doesn’t seem to be a norm that is governed by value at all.   
Further, contrast cases in ethics: think of a scenario in which a maximizing 
consequentialist disagrees with a moderate deontologist because she believes in 
some instance that causing someone harm would generate more value overall, and 
the moderate deontologist believes that one ought not cause harm.  Though we 
often describe such cases as disagreements about whether to maximize value, it 
seems like this description is unfair to the deontologist.  Presumably this is a 
terminological dispute, but one that is better captured by locating the 
disagreement in the way in which value is best responded to.   
We might think that part of what we mean to do by characterizing 
consequentialism with the slogan “the good determines the right” is to pick out a 
difference in methodology- an act consequentialist first thinks of the possible 
outcomes of available acts, compares the goodness that might come from each 
outcome, and then determines the right act.  The deontologist, on the other hand, 
presumably thinks that the nature and overall disvalue of harming others dictates 
that we ought to respond to possible instances of harm-causing in a certain sort of 
way – not by considering in each case whether it could promote the best outcome, 
but by assuming that we should not cause harm, because we already know that 
causing harm is a thing that ought not be done.  Now in cases in which a great 
amount of harm could be prevented by causing some amount of harm, moderate 
deontologists will recommend infringing the norm that prohibits causing harm.  
But otherwise, the deontologist’s mindset differs from the consequentialist’s – it’s 
typically not centered on assessing and aggregating the comparative goodness that 
comes about from particular acts.49   
                                                      
49 This description of the moderate deontologist makes the view look very similar to rule 
consequentialism.  Whereas it’s easy to articulate the difference between absolute deontology and 
consequentialism, I think it’s actually not so easy to articulate the difference between moderate 
deontology and rule consequentialism.   
 103 
The way I’ve represented consequentialists and moderate deontologists has 
them both responding, albeit in different ways, to the value at stake.  Now contrast 
that to the epistemic deontologist’s response to a scenario in which someone 
knows that by believing some very insignificant falsehood, she could come to 
believe many significant truths.  It doesn’t seem like there’s any recognition of 
value at all that goes on in heeding the corresponding epistemic norm.  Moral 
norms, like other genuine norms, are grounded in necessary value.  Presumably 
the value of the norm that prevents causing harm to others consists in the proper 
way to respect the wellbeing of other humans.  This is a kind of value that exists no 
matter if it turns out that it might be better in some instances to forgo this value in 
favor of promoting greater value.  There is no such necessary value, or so I’ve 
argued, in believing truly.  The apparent value of true belief is not explained by the 
intrinsic value of each and every true belief, but rather by the value of getting it 
right about things that matter to us.  Unlike preventing harm, which we might 
reasonably think always has at least some value, believing the truth about 
propositions that are entirely insignificant need not have any value at all.  So 
though we might take both the moderate deontologist and the consequentialist to 
demonstrate reasonable ways to respond to the value of preventing harm, I think 
the epistemic deontologist’s response, in endorsing a norm that recommends 
sacrificing great amounts of significant truths for an insignificant truth, cannot be 
taken to be a reasonable response to value.   
I’ve argued that the fact that non-teleological epistemic norms don’t 
countenance any tradeoffs is an indication that non-teleological epistemic norms 
cannot be taken to arise from or be explained by epistemic value.  And I’ve claimed 
that because all necessary normative force arises from value, we cannot take the 
kinds of norms Berker focuses on to give rise to necessary normativity.  They are 
better taken to be rule-implying as opposed to reason-implying norms.    Though 
this rule-implying norm seems to dictate a response to a very particular question – 
what belief should I now adopt about this proposition? – we shouldn’t think of this 
norm as necessarily conferring normative force. In other words, we need not see it 
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as supplying us with reason to follow it.  So where does this leave us in our quest 
to understand epistemic normativity?  
5 Rethinking Epistemic Normativity  
Berker, like many other epistemologists, tells us that epistemology is about 
answering the question “What should I believe?”.  The argument he goes on to 
make, I’ve tried to show, suggests that we understand epistemic normativity in a 
way that does not give us a satisfying answer to that question.  It’s unsatisfying in 
two ways:  the first is that I don’t think the kinds of epistemic norms he targets 
really give us an answer to the question of what we ought to believe without 
further specification.50  The second is that it leaves us with a conception of the 
domain of the epistemic as especially narrow and toothless.  To put it more exactly: 
Berker incorrectly treats epistemic norms as the norms of the entire belief state, 
and his characterization of the epistemic domain as necessarily non-teleological 
commits us to thinking of the domain as one that isn’t grounded in necessary value 
or normativity.  I think the reason for this is that Berker actually frames the 
question he asks unnecessarily narrowly.  He confines himself, I’ll try to show, to a 
view that treats the question “What should I believe now about this proposition?” 
as capable of informing us about the normativity of belief and the contours of the 
epistemic domain.  But this is merely one question that epistemologists might be 
interested in answering – indeed, it neglects to consider many valuable projects 
that have long engaged epistemologists - and we might find that different ways of 
framing the question deliver different suggestions about the norms of belief and 
how we ought to understand the projects of epistemology.  In what follows, I want 
to try to reshape our view of the focus of epistemology. In doing so, we will come 
                                                      
50 I think he unduly privileges one narrow interpretation of that question: “What should I believe about 
p (now, as I actively deliberate about whether or not p is true)?” As I argued in “Evidential Exclusivity, 
Correctness and the Nature of Belief” this leaves out other equally relevant interpretations of the 
question that will sometimes receive different answers.   
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to see that there’s use for epistemic norms other than the non-teleological 
proposition-centered norm Berker advocates.    
 Berker writes of the teleological mindset that it is “widely endorsed (and 
almost always without being explicitly argued for)” and that this “entire approach 
to normative epistemology is misguided” (2013b, 340).  Though he shows the 
centrality of the deliberative proposition-centered approach to understanding 
epistemic normativity he does consider norms that have as an evaluative focal 
point belief-forming processes as opposed to beliefs about particular propositions.  
Ultimately he rejects such a view as insufficiently aimed at the proper goals of 
epistemology.  In commenting on the scope of his argument, he says that his recipe 
of concocting problems for views that license tradeoffs applies to “all varieties of 
epistemic consequentialism that do not go so far as to restrict the conducing 
relation to the instantiation relation, or (even more radically) to give up on the 
epistemic evaluation of individual beliefs all together” (2013b, 379).  Berker comes 
from a long history of interpreting the fundamental epistemic viewpoint similarly 
narrowly.  Chisholm’s formulation of the overarching epistemic norm is that it’s a 
purely intellectual requirement to bring it about that for every proposition we 
consider, we accept it if and only if it’s true (1997, 14). Foley restricts the norm to 
“now believing what is true and now avoiding what is false” (1987, 8 my 
emphasis), and Fumerton tries to show that even this norm isn’t restricted enough 
– that the goal must be articulated as now believing what is true with respect to a 
single proposition (1995, 12).   
 I think the history of conceiving of this narrowly single-subject (usually 
first-person), time-now, proposition-centered perspective as the focal perspective 
of epistemology is in large part due to a background assumption that epistemic 
norms are simply norms about belief, which is itself normatively or constitutively 
truth-aimed.    I’ve argued elsewhere that this isn’t true.51  Now I want to argue 
                                                      
51 See “The Doxastic Account of the Epistemic” and “Evidential Exclusivity, Correctness and the Nature of 
Belief”. I argue there that, though the phenomenon of “transparency” can explain why we might have 
this conception of belief, it is merely a feature of how we’re apparently constructed to treat 
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that, since epistemic normativity is not the same as the normativity of the state of 
belief, we need not be confined to such a narrow perspective in our understanding 
of the appropriate purview of the epistemic domain.  Instead, I think we should 
conceive of the contours of epistemic normativity and the resulting norms as those 
that furnish recommendations for how we ought to conduct our epistemic projects 
– namely those projects that are aimed at inquiring about the truth of some 
question or collection of questions that matter to us.    
 Whereas the focal question has largely been taken to be “What should I 
believe now about this proposition?” we can think about a number of related 
questions that the epistemic domain can also rightfully consider. 
 
• What should I / some subject / some group of subjects  
believe about  
• this proposition / this collection of propositions 
• now / at some time / over some range of time in the future 
 
And though we might think that belief is a mental attitude that is central to our 
investigation of the proper focal questions of inquiry, we must also ask more 
broadly what mental and non-mental actions we should take to best succeed in our 
inquiries.  What (sometimes evidentially insufficiently-justified) propositions 
should we accept for further investigation?  Would endorsing some particular 
evidentially insufficiently-justified proposition raise the likelihood that we will go 
on to acquire important true beliefs about some topic of inquiry?  What habits 
should we form to be better inquirers? 
  At this juncture, a common line of objection will be raised.  Epistemologists 
will argue that the norms associated with the questions I’ve raised will be 
practical, not epistemic norms.  But how should we interpret the force of this 
apparent objection?  Consider again the case in which Jane is determining whether 
                                                      
deliberation, not a feature that gives rise to normative facts about belief, nor one that adequately 
applies to the full functional profile of belief.    
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to believe in God against her evidence.  We can contrast the epistemic with the 
non-epistemic benefits of adopting this belief.  We took the epistemic benefits to 
include the many significant true beliefs she would go on to have if she secured 
funding from the religious funding agency.  A non-epistemic benefit might include 
that a belief in God would lessen her fear of death.  So in this sense there’s a 
straightforward distinction in play – we can characterize Jane as believing for 
epistemic reasons (in at least one sense) because her belief is directed toward the 
pursuit of truth. It has as its goal the end that characterizes the epistemic domain.   
But some will nonetheless say that a norm that licenses adopting a belief for 
its benefits is a practical norm aimed at an epistemic end.  I take the root of such an 
objection to be that the norm is about action and not belief.  In “The Doxastic 
Account of the Epistemic” I wrote about the problems with understanding 
“epistemic” as synonymous with “belief”.  But I think there are further positive 
reasons to shift our understanding of the epistemic domain to one that is 
characterized by the pursuit of significant truth (or knowledge or understanding).  
This is, after all, how other familiar normative domains are oriented – we can think 
of aesthetic norms as oriented toward beauty, moral norms as oriented toward 
moral goodness, etc.  And once we give up on the idea that epistemic norms just 
are the norms of the belief state in favor of a conception of epistemic norms as 
norms that are directed toward the pursuit of truth, then we can see that we will 
need to recognize more means to achieving the epistemic end than just belief 
adoption.   
One observation we will make as we expand the purview of the epistemic 
domain is that so far we’ve talked about norms of belief adoption in an 
unabashedly instrumentalist way.  We consider whether we should or shouldn’t 
believe some proposition in order to secure some further benefit.  Both teleologists 
and non-teleologists about epistemic normativity often proceed as though such 
consideration is appropriate – that it makes sense to ask ourselves whether we 
should believe or refrain from believing and accept the answer as if it gives us a 
directive for what we go on to do.  But many will have already objected to a much 
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more basic aspect of this picture, which is that it doesn’t make sense to treat belief 
adoption in this instrumentalist way because belief adoption is not something we 
do so much as something that happens to us.  Resistance to this instrumentalist 
conception can come from two different but related worries. One is that as a 
descriptive fact it seems that we simply don’t have the kind of voluntary control 
over belief that makes instrumentalist norms fitting.  The other is that norms are 
prescriptive – they tell us what to do or how to be.  But it’s commonly held that it’s 
not the case that we ought to do something or that we ought to be a certain way if 
it’s not within our power to do that thing or be that way.   
 Though I in fact think that both of these worries about doxastic voluntarism 
are overstated,52 I also think that epistemologists’ insistence on confining the 
evaluative focal point to the very question that it makes least sense to ask given 
our desire to deploy instrumentalist norms – in other words confining our focal 
point to current active deliberation about a proposition, the scenario in which we 
are most forced to take into account exclusively evidential considerations - is 
perplexing.   
Whereas it has been common to respond to prescriptions for 
instrumentalist belief adoptions with rejoinders like “But that’s not really belief, 
that’s acceptance!” where the critic means to imply that we’ve exited the domain of 
prescriptive epistemic norms because we are no longer talking about the state of 
belief, we can now happily affirm that it is indeed acceptance we’re speaking of, 
and that it’s no less epistemic for that fact.  And further, that it’s much more fitting 
to talk about acceptance, endorsement (or other more suitably instrumentalist 
attitudes/actions) than belief, because we’re more readily able to accept or 
                                                      
52 First, I think that the degree to which classically voluntary actions are under our direct control is 
overstated and there are many actions that we talk about as voluntary over which we have at best 
indirect control (See Rinard’s “No Exception for Belief” for great examples, and second, I think it makes 
perfectly good sense to issue normative judgments about departures from ideal states because these 
are not necessarily condemnations or declarations of blameworthiness that carry implications about 
responsibility. 
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endorse insufficiently evidentially justified propositions than we are to believe 
them in cases of conscious deliberation.   
 Though we have ample examples that point to the dominance in 
epistemology of the proposition-centered veritistic notion that governs belief and 
credence, philosophers have done valuable work on other projects that will help 
fill out our broadened conception of epistemic normativity.  Norms of scientific 
investigation and inquiry have long been of interest to philosophers of science and 
have enjoyed renewed interest amongst contemporary epistemologists.  Van 
Fraassen, for instance has argued that it is appropriate for scientists to accept 
scientific theories, and that informativeness can justify acceptance though it does 
not justify belief.  He characterizes acceptance as involving a certain kind of 
commitment, which for scientists entails the adoption of a certain research 
program (van Fraassen 1980).   
Kitcher has famously talked about the division of cognitive labor in 
scientific communities as a key component of epistemic success.  The fact that 
scientists are not individual agents working alone in laboratories developing 
theories solely on the basis of their own findings, but are rather integrated into 
communities where there are external factors like funding and prestige can lead 
them to divide resources and coordinate research efforts in an investigative 
domain (Kitcher 1992).  It’s interesting to note that van Fraassen’s work on 
acceptance and Kitcher’s work on the division of cognitive labor were both met 
with responses that targeted whether or not such observations had an impact on 
what we saw as genuinely epistemic inquiry - a large response to van Fraassen’s 
work has consisted in how we should understand the relationship between the 
attitudes of acceptance and belief, and it’s been highlighted that Kitcher’s work on 
the division of cognitive labor actually focuses on the practical reasons for 
researching views that are less likely to be true.53   
                                                      
53 See for examples Maher 1990 and Horwich 1991.   
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 Contemporary projects include Fleisher’s “Rational Endorsement”, in which 
he pushes for us to recognize a distinct attitude from both belief and acceptance 
which he calls “endorsement.”54  This is the attitude he thinks is rational for 
researchers to take during the course of inquiry.  He points out that the recent 
work on tradeoffs that has been the subject of this paper, and in addition recent 
successes in accuracy-based utility theory (such as vindications of probabilism, 
conditionalization, and other coherence norms by appeal to accuracy alone) have 
lent support  to the view that the rationality of belief is determined solely by 
considerations of whether it itself is likely to be true (Fleisher 2017).55  But in 
addition to reasons to believe a particular proposition is true – reasons he calls 
“intrinsic reasons” we should also make a place for reasons that are about 
promoting or attaining the truth, but aren’t themselves indicators of truth.  Reasons 
for endorsing a theory that stem from the fact that doing so would promote 
healthy inquiry are “extrinsic epistemic reasons” (Fleisher 2017, 15, citing a 
distinction made in Steel, 2010).  Unlike Kitcher’s reasons for the distribution of 
cognitive labor which cite funding and prestige, these reasons seem undoubtedly 
epistemic – they’re reasons that target how to pursue truth in inquiry, even if this 
pursuit is global and less direct.     
Information gathering and inquiry are central to our human existence – 
equally central, we might think, as questions about whether or not to believe the 
truth about a particular proposition, if only because such deliberation usually 
happens below the level of conscious awareness of us, and thus is not even 
typically subject to instrumentalist considerations.  Though sometimes we’re in 
situations in which we have no conflicting goals and we’re deliberating about what 
to believe, more often our pursuit of truth puts us in other kinds of scenarios with 
differently configured aims.  Thinking about which methods we ought to employ to 
better achieve those aims is thus a worthy enterprise.  When we see the epistemic 
                                                      
54 See in addition Friedman’s “Inquiry and Belief” (forthcoming) for another recent example of work that 
considers the need for a wider epistemic focal point.    
55 See for examples Joyce 1998 and Pettigrew 2016. 
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domain as united by its orientation toward the fundamental value of significant 
truth or knowledge and as reflecting this broader array of perspectives, scenarios, 
and aims, we see it as giving rise not just to a rule-implying norm that provides an 
answer to one particular epistemic question, but in addition to norms that appear 
to confer necessary normative force.    
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